



A PRIMER OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

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Je ne propose rien,
Je ne suppose même rien,
J'expose.

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P R E F A C E

THE purpose of this book is to supply the beginner in Philosophy with a kind of student's guide to the problems of the science and the solutions which have been proposed. History is subordinated to exposition, but it has proved natural to observe a chronological order within the divisions of the subject-matter, inasmuch as the succession of schools corresponds to the stages in the evolution of thought.

Necessarily, much has been mentioned in a sketch of less than 128 pages which might have been developed in separate treatises; but the writer hopes that nothing has been omitted which is essential to the design of providing an Introduction to Philosophy in as brief a compass and in as accurate a form as are compatible with clearness, thoroughness, and that faithfulness to truth which is the last and best lesson of the philosophers.

A. S. R.

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PART I

PHILOSOPHY AND ITS BRANCHES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THERE is a prevalent idea that Philosophy is a subject accessible only to certain intellects, or that it is a study adapted to the pursuit of a few unpractical men who have nothing better to do than to worry their heads about the solution of problems belonging rather to heaven than to earth ; that it deals with the pale ghosts of conceptions whose domain is abstract thought, but which have no application to real life. This is a mistake.

What places man on a footing of superiority over the animal is his thinking, reasoning power. The animal sees, hears, and even remembers, but it makes use of these faculties only for its immediate necessity. Man, however, sees the various phenomena of life and nature, forms conceptions and ideas, and then tries to reason and to find out the relation existing between these various facts and phenomena, to conceive the *whole*, and thus gain a clear understanding of things. When man acts in this way, we say he *philosophizes*. What do we when we philosophize? We *think* about a certain object, concrete or abstract, and endeavour to reply to the following questions :

(1) What is that particular object upon which our mind reflects?

(2) What is the origin of this object or idea?

(3) In what relation does it stand to other objects or ideas?

In other words, we reflect upon the essence or nature, the origin and relation of things and ideas. Every man does this at some time or other, and therefore every normal thinking man who has not absolutely become a prey to sensuous pleasure and engrossed in materialistic enjoyment, philosophizes to a certain extent and is more or less a philosopher. The normal thinking man, however, who occasionally considers and reflects, investigates or doubts, and is convinced of and holds certain views of his own about things, is not yet in the strict sense what we understand by philosopher, just as he who in daily life mends the broken pane or repairs the lock that is out of order is not yet a glazier or a locksmith. The professional glazier or locksmith is he who makes the work his sole and special pursuit in life, and who has not only had a proper training, but, as the result of constant practice, has become efficient and competent in his work. He knows the exact method and process by which to arrive with less labour at a more satisfactory result than the unskilled man. The professional philosopher is he who has made it the special aim of his life to study, to inquire into, and to reason upon the nature of things. *His instruments are thoughts.* Through practice he acquires a certain capacity to perceive things more rapidly. And just as the various artisans usually are, or at least ought to be, acquainted with the details of their work, and with the latest discoveries and inventions relating to them, the professional philosopher must know all that others preceding him have thought and said with regard to the questions that occupy his mind. But why should we philosophize? What do we gain by it? According to Aristotle, it was astonishment that first made man philosophize. Surrounded by the universe in its varying manifestations, face to face with life and its vicissitudes, man is seized with a feeling of wonder, and he begins to ask the why, the wherefore, and the whither. The universe, with all that it contains, is a riddle to him. The attempt to solve this riddle is *Philosophy*. There is first the interested aim of utility that prompts him. Thus it is stated that the science of geometry originated among the Egyptians in the necessity that arose of defining the

boundaries of individual property after the yearly inundations of the Nile. The nomadic Chaldeans studied astronomy in order to be able to guide their herds. Man tries to solve the riddles of life so as to be able to know how to act and guard his interests, be they temporal or spiritual. The human mind seeks to obtain a clear, consistent, and true insight into the world and life by solving their riddles. The problems are various and manifold. From the earth which we tread to the star-studded vault above, what an immensity of objects for the human intellect to deal with!—what a vast desert of ignorance!—where the human mind is daily endeavouring to discover a new oasis and to make a step forward to penetrate into the secrets of nature and divulge them for the benefit of humanity. But gradually, by trying to escape ignorance, there arises the desire to *know*. We wish to know for the sake of knowledge, independently of practical use. Man has by nature a desire to know. This desire, deeply rooted in his breast, is indestructible. It is this strenuous impulse, which becomes stronger with the growth of reason, and which seeks to know the high and fundamental truths of life and existence, the reason and connection of things, that causes man to philosophize. He becomes conscious of his ignorance, he doubts, he forms conceptions and ideas, and becomes convinced of their truth. The truth he has thus gained is not confined to the dead kingdom of abstract speculation: it ultimately applies to real, practical life. Philosophy, therefore, is the yearning and striving after knowledge of the hidden causes of things, with the view to the establishment of perfect harmony between our ideas and our actions, to establish a consistency between what we *do* and what we *think*. To escape ignorance, to find truth, to expose error that covers itself with the flimsy veil of seeming truth, is its aim in life.

The origin and history of the term “philosophy” illustrates this. According to the Greek historian Herodotus, Cræsus said to Solon: “I have heard that thou hast travelled over many countries philosophizing”—meaning thereby, trying to acquire knowledge. Pericles used the

term "philosophy" as designating the striving after culture. In any case, the word owes its origin to an admission of ignorance and an eager desire for knowledge. Pythagoras (but it is more correct to attribute the saying to Socrates) said: "Wisdom belongs to God alone, man can only *strive* to know; he can be a lover of wisdom, he can yearn for knowledge and search for truth," which state of mind is clearly defined by the words "philosophy" and "philosopher," *φίλος* (*philos*) being the Greek for "lover," and *σοφία* (*sophia*) for "wisdom." A *sophos*, or wise man, on the other hand, was one who distinguished himself in some art or craft. Originally the term was applied to one possessing either a physical or a mental accomplishment—to a musician or a cook, navigator or carpenter; but gradually it came to be applied only to one possessing mental superiority. Socrates thus modestly called himself a philosopher (or wisdom-lover) in distinction to the sophists (or wisdom-mongers), who, like commercial hawkers, travelled about the country and dealt in all sorts of knowledge which they sold for money, and which the buyers also intended for practical use only.

Philosophy, then, deals with all possible problems; in a word, with the universe. We divide these problems, however, into three classes, according to the form and subject-matter of the investigation:—

(1) The problem of unity or of the fundamental principle, the omnipotent, omncreative force that animates the universe. This part is called *Metaphysics*.

(2) The problem of plurality, or the manifold manifestations of the world. This is *Natural Philosophy*.

(3) The problem of the individual creatures of which man is to us the most important.¹

Psychology, or the knowledge of the mental life of man, deals again (1) with the method of how to think and how to arrive at a true conclusion by means of thought: this part is called *Logic*, and its object is to develop the idea of

¹ Anthropology deals with the life of man in all its being and evolution, the life of the body as well as that of the mind. The knowledge of the former is *Somatology*, or *Physiology*; that of the latter is *Psychology*.

the *True*; (2) with the sentiment: this is called . . . it develops the idea of the *Beautiful*; (3) with the desire: this is the domain of *Ethics*: it turns upon the idea of the *Good*.

"The Psychology of cognition," says Professor Sully,¹ "forms the basis of the regulative Science of Logic, which aims at giving us rules by which we may know that we are thinking or reasoning correctly. The Psychology of the feelings underlies *Æsthetics* as the regulative science which seeks to determine the true objective standard of what is beautiful and worthy of admiration."

The conduct of man for the attainment of the good is regulated by duty. Duty presupposes law. Law is either that of nature or dictated by human reason. Hence we have a Philosophy of Law. The problems which turn upon the relations of the individuals to each other form another philosophical discipline called Sociology, which includes also the Philosophy of History.

Thus we have the following disciplines of Philosophy:—

- (1) Metaphysics.
- (2) Philosophy of Nature.
- (3) Psychology.
- (4) Logic.
- (5) *Æsthetics*.
- (6) Ethics.
- (7) Philosophy of Law.
- (8) Sociology and Philosophy of History.

¹ "The Human Mind," p. 12.

CHAPTER II

METAPHYSICS

§ 1. THE universe with all its manifestations can be regarded scientifically from two points of view. From one point of view we investigate the forms in which the universe appears to *us*, *i.e.* to our senses, leaving aside the unknown and unknowable causes; from the second point of view we consider the very essence of the phenomena, independently of how they affect our senses. The first view is the object of the positive sciences, the second that of Metaphysics.

Each science employs certain conceptions as its tools and instruments. It does not, however, question the value of these instruments and utensils which it finds ready for its purpose. They are there, and the fact is sufficient. These conceptions are space, time, quantity, quality, cause, effect, motion, power, matter, form, etc.—conceptions applied to things in existence. For all the sciences the cause of a fact is nothing else than another fact, the cause of a movement is another movement; the cause of a sound, for instance, is the movement of the air—it is nothing but another state or condition. Thus the scientists, each in his own branch, investigate the various manifestations, the forms and changes of matter, as they perceive them, without inquiring *what* matter is or even *why* it is. All they wish to know is the *how*. Their sphere of knowledge is limited by the boundary-lines of the finite, by facts based on experience. The human spirit, however, in its inquisitiveness, is not satisfied with this knowledge. The fleeting manifestations which form

material, real life cannot exist by themselves ; there must be something permanent and eternal, some hidden energy, something similar to our own will when we act or move our body, something Infinite, Everlasting, and Absolute, which is the cause of all reality, and which the language of religion calls God. There should, therefore, be a science which takes as the object of its investigations these very conceptions, of which other sciences avail themselves, but which they have become accustomed to consider as needing no explanation. This science is Metaphysics. It does not deal with the laws and facts of the material world as revealed to our senses, but it discusses the very testimony of the senses, dealing with the essence of things, searching for ultimate reasons. It does not accept facts on the guarantee of common sense alone, but asks for the something unknown upon which other sciences establish themselves unquestioningly. Not content with a knowledge of things which, perhaps, appear to us differently from what they are in reality, Metaphysics wishes to know what is *behind* or *beyond* the natural phenomena.

We may say that it endeavours to grasp the hidden springs that move the world, that it longs to enter into the mysteries of the great "Unknown," and thus to touch the beating pulse of the universe.

The same craving and yearning to grasp the Unknown and Mysterious which in uncultured and simple minds result in superstitious beliefs lead the philosopher to metaphysical speculation. Metaphysics thus inquires into the last or first cause, and is the science of the Really Existent. It is that part of Philosophy which occupies itself with the most general questions of philosophic research.

§ 2. Whether Metaphysics will ever attain its aim, or whether it will remain a beggar on the threshold of the Hall of the great Unknown, only speculating on the nature of its contents, for ever fighting and struggling with the ultimate difficulties of the many riddles of the Universe, are questions to which we do not presume to give an answer. Whether human reason will ever be capable of solving satisfactorily these problems, or

whether Metaphysics is aiming at the impossible, are points which have been and still are tasking the scientific and philosophic world. It has been said that Metaphysics and the high order of poetry meet and mingle, that "the metaphysician is a poet who has lost his vocation, because he is searching for something above facts."

Voltaire said that "Metaphysics constitute the romance of the mind and are more entertaining than geometry, where we have to undergo the perpetual trouble of calculating and measuring, whilst in metaphysics we dream pleasantly."

Mr. Buckle, in his "Civilization in England," says: "The metaphysical method consists in each observer studying the operations of his own mind. It is a method by which no discovery has ever yet been made in any branch of knowledge."

And Ludwig Buechner, the famous author of "Force and Matter," declares in one of his last works, "Am Sterbelager des Jahrhunderts" ("At the Deathbed of the Century"), that whilst Psychology, Logic, Æsthetics, Ethics, Philosophy of Law, and History of Philosophy have a *raison d'être*, and ought to be studied by the human mind, Metaphysics, as the impossible science of that which is beyond Nature and beyond our senses, must now definitely be relegated to the lumber-room of useless objects.

§ 3. The term Metaphysics—*μετὰ τὰ φυσικά* (*mēta ta physica*)—arose much later than the problems with which it occupies itself. The problems had already been treated by the Ionian philosophers and by Plato, who calls their study Dialectics. Metaphysics deals with that which is beyond or behind nature. The term itself is due to a simple literary accident. Originally it was not applied with this intention. The friends and followers of Aristotle¹ grouped his investigations concerning the questions about the essence of things, which bore the title of "First Philosophy," and placed them *after* that part which he had called Physics, and therefore styled it "Metaphysics," *i.e.* after Physics. In the old Greek philosophy the line

¹ Especially Andronicus of Rhodes.

of demarcation between physical and metaphysical problems was not rigorously drawn. Physics in Greek meant properly what we now understand by Metaphysics. Since then it has been variously defined. Wolff, the German philosopher, styled it "Ontology," the Science of Being, or the Science of the Really Existent, in contradistinction to the Phenomenal or that which is only perceived by the senses. Eduard v. Hartmann treated metaphysical problems under the name of the "Unconscious."

Kant thought that our human reason is so tragically constructed that whilst it sees itself forcibly attracted towards questions beyond that which is revealed by the senses, it is utterly incapable of solving them. He therefore, in his "Critique of Pure Reason," demanded that before entering upon metaphysical problems, a preliminary research of our human understanding and power should be made. (His system is called Criticism.)

In England, the country of common sense, metaphysical speculations were with few exceptions (Berkeley principally) not favoured.

In a subsequent chapter I shall deal with the various metaphysical problems and the schools that endeavoured to solve them.

CHAPTER III

NATURAL PHILOSOPHY

§ 1. THE objects of human research are either "nature" in its narrower sense, *i.e.* the system of things visible to us which is comprehended in the word *world*, or "mind," *i.e.* the power which is capable of perceiving, knowing, and reflecting upon that very world. Things revealed to us by our senses attract our attention in preference to abstract conceptions which are only the result of more mature reflection, when the mind is already capable of turning into and reflecting upon itself. The child remembers first the names of things that are distinguished by their colour, heaviness, sound, etc.—in a word, those that appeal to the senses. Nations in their early state of culture are children in their ideas. The growth of national thought proceeds on the same lines as the mental development of any individual human being. Language illustrates this. Language is the expression of sensuous perceptions. It gives names and assigns definitions to what is revealed to us by our senses or conceived by our powers of reflection and understanding. Now, the science of language has proved that the names for concrete objects, of whose existence we become aware through our senses, have been formed much earlier than the words by which we define the acts of seeing, hearing, etc., themselves. The earliest philosophical researches turned therefore towards visible matter, *i.e.* the aggregation of things called the world. Their chief problems were: What is all that vast crowd of appearances which we perceive, all the natural phenomena that so often change and assume so many new changes? What is the substance, element, or

matter that constitutes their basis and remains constant under all these various changes? These questions form the subject-matter of the philosophy of nature, as distinguished from the philosophy of mind.

§ 2. Plato has laid down his ideas on the subject in a treatise entitled "Timæus." Plato clearly stated the distinction between the physical and the metaphysical; nature was the realm of *becoming* as distinct from that of *being*. Aristotle's conception of nature and his Philosophy of Nature is contained chiefly in his work *Tà Φυσικά* ("Physics"). In modern times, however, this part of Philosophy has been termed Cosmology, and Physics forms a part of it. The human mind before reflecting upon itself turned its gaze, during the first stage of its development and growth, to the outer world, *i.e.* to nature and its investigation. Nature is a unity manifesting itself in a plurality of forms, and from the very beginning of its existence the human race has tried to discover the permanent law underlying the continual change. To recognize the fundamental element that lies hidden under the phenomena is the aim and purport of the Philosophy of Nature. The earliest philosophers of Greece—Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, turned their attention to these questions. Some of them maintained that the basis of all the phenomenal changes is water; others thought it was air. The earliest Greek philosophers are therefore called Natural Philosophers, *i.e.* they reflected upon matter as disguised or as revealed to our senses. They were the first to start the journey upon the thorny road to truth, and naturally proceeded slowly and hesitatingly, endeavouring to explain the plurality of the phenomena, to rise above the vulgar errors of the senses, and to conceive the world as a unity. Whilst, however, the Metaphysics of the Ionian philosophers springs from Physics, that of the Pythagoreans is grafted on Mathematics. The former were interested in matter and its eternal movement, the latter were impressed by the order which prevails in the world, by the unity, proportion, and harmony in its contrasts, the mathematical relations underlying all things. Everything in geometry, in astronomy, and in music is ultimately reduced to number.

Number is the innermost essence and the principle of the world : things are sensible numbers. Whilst a number is the essence of things, *unity* is the essence of number.¹ In the Middle Ages, when Catholicism held full sway, the study of nature was neglected. Faith, absolute, blind faith, the reflection of the spirit upon itself and communion with the absolute, were the predominant features, and there was no room for natural studies and the fleeting earthly questions of an ephemeral existence. Nay, a sort of contempt arose for such studies, which consequently became very rare. With Protestantism the spirit of freedom arose. The discovery of new countries aided it greatly. The study of ancient Philosophy was revived, and Galileo, Kepler, Bruno, and others turned their minds to the study of the universe, or Kosmos, which resulted in great discoveries. The planet upon which we live was found to be nothing but "a little speck revolving round one of the many suns that are scattered in space like so many sand-grains in the desert." Natural science, however, was still intermingled and interwoven with Philosophy of Nature. Even the philosophers Descartes and Wolff made no distinction between the two. Neither did Newton draw any line of demarcation. Only with the celebrated book "*Système de la Nature*" (1770 : published under the name of Mirabaud, but the real author of which was Baron Holbach), and especially with Kant and Schelling, the distinction between Philosophy of Nature and Natural Philosophy became manifest. Since then natural science has gone its own way, making gigantic strides, while the Philosophy of Nature is, strictly speaking, limited to metaphysical questions or to the investigations of the causes whose effects are the discoveries of natural science. Thus the Philosophy of Nature examines the conceptions such as *force, energy, matter, motion, life, etc.*, which form the subject-matter of natural science.

¹ It is altogether unhistorical to attribute the Pythagorean doctrines to Pythagoras, who lived in the sixth century B.C. As far as we know of his life, he founded a kind of religion or brotherhood, and was a man of grand ethical and political efficiency. Neither Aristotle nor Plato speaks of the teachings of Pythagoras, but of the Pythagoreans.

CHAPTER IV

PSYCHOLOGY

§ 1. AMONG the themes that awaken the interest of man and upon which he directs his inquiries and exercises his powers of thought, are, as we have seen in the first instance, the universe, or, in a narrower sense, the world, and the ever-changing, ever-varying phenomena of nature, multitudinous in their aspects, baffling in their enigmas, and dazzling in their glory and splendour. The desire to understand nature and so conquer and subdue it on the one hand, and the *wonder* at that which most impresses the senses on the other, are the first stimulators to philosophic thought. The dawn of philosophy has therefore been Natural Philosophy. It is characterized by its tendency to unravel the mysteries of the world. Next to the surrounding material world, however, that which interests man most is himself.

Science has proved that our earth is nothing but a small planet revolving in boundless space; but in remote antiquity as well as in modern times man considered himself as the chief creature in the universe. However firmly convinced he may be that the star-lit canopy above him has not been created for his personal use, or that other planets besides the earth are also inhabited, he never ceases to consider himself superior to everything else in the world. The reason is that with his mental development he gradually becomes conscious of his existence, of his knowledge or want of it, of his feelings, desires, and thoughts, and of his power to express and communicate them to others—in a word, of his being a world within a world.

He is ^{urged} by some impulse to know ; he meditates and tries to suggest a meaning to what baffles his understanding, and all the while he begins to wonder at himself, at the very power that he has to move and to talk, to will and to wish, to feel and to desire. It is said that Socrates brought down philosophy from heaven to earth, *i.e.* to man.¹ In other words, thought, at the initiative of this great Greek thinker, was directed to things human, to the study of man himself in preference to the study of the surrounding material world. *γινῶθι σεαυτὸν* ("know thyself") is said to have been uttered by him (although, as a matter of fact, Thales had already uttered it before him). And, ever since, the questions which the melancholy youth in Heine's poems is supposed to ask in the silence of the night, standing before the wide waste of the ocean :

— Was ist der Mensch,
Woher ist er kommen,
Wo geht er hin?

("What is man ? where does he come from ? whither does he go ?") have puzzled the thinkers of all ages, when the human race was still in its crude state, in the beginning of intellectual development, at the height of mental culture and civilization. "Many are the wonders," says the Greek dramatist Sophocles, "but there is no greater

¹ Man consists of body and soul or mind. The study of man is therefore that of the soul and that of the body. By the term "Anthropology" we designate all studies relating to man, mind or body, man as an individual or as a species, and in his relations to other manumalia.

The term "Anthropology" is of Greek origin, composed of *ἄνθρωπος* (*anthropos* = man) and of *λόγος* (*logos* = discourse or science), *i.e.* science of man. Thus "Anthropology" occupies itself with everything relating to man, treating of his origin, development, and of his diffusion over the globe. The questions exclusively dealing with man's body give rise to such sciences as *anatomy* and *medicine*, and are commonly called *Somatology*, or science of the body (*soma* = body, and *logos* = science), and belong to the domain of natural science. The characteristic distinctions of the varieties of mankind and the relations of the different races, to each other form the science of *Ethnology* (from *ethnos* = people, and *logos*).

wonder than man." These questions, What is man. What is his place in nature? and What is his relation to the universe of things—questions which, as Professor Huxley said, underlie all others, and are more deeply interesting than any others—have busied all manner of heads.

Häupter in Hieroglyphenmützen,
Häupter im Turban und schwarzen Barett,
Perrücken Häupter,
Und tausend andere arme
Schwitzende Menschenhäupter.¹

They have replied to them according to the spirit of the time.

§ 2. The questions relating to man's soul or "mind" form the science called "Psychology." It is called Psychology from *ψυχή* (*psyche* = soul) and *logos*, and treats of mental and moral man as distinguished from physical man.

Whether the soul or mind is something apart from and independent of the body, or whether the thinking, reasoning faculty which distinguishes man from brute—and which becomes more and more developed and differentiated with the growth and advance of the human race from the crude to the civilised state—is dependent upon the bodily or physical condition of man, is not for us to discuss here. These questions do not fall within the scope of a popular treatise. We shall merely observe that the connection between what is called physical and that which is called psychical, between the visible organs of the human body and those that seem hidden, has become in recent times a subject of great interest, and has led to many important scientific results. One need only mention such names as Huxley, Buechner, etc.

In this treatise, which is written from a merely historical and objective point of view, I have to refrain from pronouncing upon such questions as to whether the physical, and mental form a unity or a dualism, whether reason is an acquired or an innate faculty ;

¹ Heads in hieroglyphical nightcaps,
Heads in turbans and swarthy bonnets,
Heads in wigs,
And a thousand other poor and perspiring heads
of us mortals.

whether, as Professor Huxley says, "the mental development of humanity is similar to the metamorphosis of the caterpillar into the butterfly, periodically casting off its skin, and the human mind in its grandest manifestations is the product of nature's forces and composed of the same materials as the sun and the planets"; or whether thought proceeds from the soul, which is "a divine spark from above." Whether, "when we have shuffled off this mortal coil," the soul will return to some unknown spiritual home, as the theologian maintains: "the body will return to the earth and the spirit to God," or whether thought will vanish with matter, both standing in inseparable connection, and man disappear like a plant, are questions which we can only mention but not discuss.

Thought may be the outcome of the "soul" or simply a physical faculty, a function of the brain which is more finely organised in man than in other mammalia. The important point for us is that the brain is in any case the organ of thought which vanishes from us with matter, and that the "lawyer's quiddits and quilletts, cases, tenures, and tricks" are vanished from the skull which Hamlet takes up in the churchyard.

As long as thought exists in its connection with the body, as long as the brain continues its functions, we know and think, will, wish, feel, and are conscious of doing so.

"To study the process and manner by which we arrive at this consciousness, and to investigate the essence of that very power of doing so, i.e. our power of cognition and consciousness as well as the limits and validity of human reason, the complex functions by which we are able to conceive, to judge, or to imagine is the aim of Psychology."

Psychology therefore deals with the operations of the mind.

"Its main concern," says Professor Sully, in "The Human Mind," "is to give an account of the phenomena of the developed consciousness as it manifests itself in man. Such a scientific account will include a proper arrangement or classification of the various distinguishable factors that enter into our mental life, and also an

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explanation of their origin and development. The aim of Psychology is thus not merely to describe mental phenomena, but to trace back their genesis and history."

It treats of our own powers of attention and sensation, of perception, memory or the power of retention, of recognition, volition, of freedom of the will or voluntary movement as well as of imagination and illusions, of feelings and emotions, pleasure and pain, smell and taste.

Psychology inquires into the operations of the mind with a view to discover its laws and the processes by which they produce these phenomena, as well as into its very nature, essence, or substance, its immutability and spirituality, and its connection with and dependence upon the other bodily organs, and the mutual action and reaction existing between them.

"Just as the anatomist," says Professor Huxley, "resolves limbs into tissues, and tissues into cells, the psychologist directs mental phenomena into elementary states of consciousness." The physiologist inquires into the way in which the so-called "functions" of the body are performed, the psychologist studies the "faculties" of the mind. Whilst the physical sciences that have to do with the outer material world investigate by means of the senses, Psychology observes and investigates by means of a particular power called "inner sense."

In a word, Psychology treats of mental life, intellectual or affective, of consciousness in all its aspects. The phenomena and facts which form the materials with which Psychology deals are derived either from consciousness or perception.

§ 3. What we think, know, or feel is either the result of innate cognition or a reflex of what we have received from without by the medium of the senses. We direct our attention to what is going on in us when we do a certain thing, when we think or feel. But we study mental phenomena not only in ourselves but also around us, as they manifest themselves externally in others. We study looks, gestures, actions, and speech of others, and arrive at conclusions as to what is going on in them, by saying what when we ourselves act in such a way it is thus that we think or feel.

"There are two distinct ways of investigating the phenomena of mind," says Professor Sully. "In the first place, I may reflect on my own mental processes at the time of their occurrence or immediately after their occurrence. In this way, for example, I can note a succession of thoughts, or a colouring or biasing of the thoughts by a feeling of anger. This way of approaching mental processes is known as the direct or internal mode of observation, or as introspection (from *intro*, inwards, and *spicere* or *specere*, to look). In the second place, I may study a mental process in another mind so far as this clearly betrays itself in outward manifestation. Thus in listening to a person's talk I can note the connections which his mind forms between certain ideas, in watching his actions I am able to study the play of his motives. This is called the indirect or external way of investigating mind, because we are here getting at mental facts indirectly through the medium of certain external manifestations perceived by the senses, as the audible word or cry, the visible movement or change of colour" ("The Teacher's Handbook of Psychology," p. 17).

§ 4. The study of Psychology is older than its name, which is used for the first time towards the end of the sixteenth century. But we have mentioned the Socratic maxim (possibly due to Thales) of γνῶθι σεαυτόν—know thyself. Aristotle wrote a work entitled περὶ ψυχῆς,¹ or "On the Soul," where he discusses the faculties of the mental part of man, which for him are identical with soul and life.

The French philosopher René Descartes (1596—1650) gave to Psychology a new direction. In reply to the question, "How do I know that I exist?" Descartes replied in his famous utterance, "*Cogito, ergo sum*:" "I know that I think and that I am conscious of thinking, therefore I know that I exist."

The sources from which the mind derives its knowledge are, as it has already been pointed out, twofold—*intuition* and *experience*. John Locke (1632—1704), the English philosopher, in his "Essay concerning Human Understanding" (1690), treated the question of innate ideas

¹ In three books.

(of inner and outer perception). According to him the human mind is a sheet of white paper upon which experiences, entering through the gates of the senses, leave their impressions. In this way we gather our knowledge by sensation and reflection. In the last century, under the influence of the positive doctrines, a new tendency arose to separate Psychology from Philosophy, and establish it as a pure science on the same lines as Physiology, since it has nothing whatever to do with metaphysical problems.

[Psychology, treating of the operations of the mind, will, therefore, after its general investigations, endeavour to discover and establish the laws and rules which guide thought. It will treat of the methods how to think, and how to arrive at a true conclusion by means of thought. It thus gives rise to a separate branch of Philosophy which we call Logic.]

CHAPTER V

§ 1. IN one of Molière's plays, *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme*, Monsieur Jourdain, the rich shopkeeper who wishes to play the gentleman and to improve his neglected education, is surprised when the professor of languages whom he has engaged informs him that language is either prose or poetry, and that everything that is not poetry is necessarily prose. "And what am I speaking?" asks the astonished bourgeois.

"You are speaking prose," replies the professor.

"So I have been speaking prose all my life," says M. Jourdain, "without my knowing it," and in his delight he hastens to inform his wife and household of the new discovery. Many a man, frightened at the mere mention of Logic or at the suggestion of studying a book on the subject, would be as surprised as M. Jourdain, were he informed that he had been and still is applying Logic in his daily conversation, in his arguments with his household and his friends, in the exposition of his political and religious opinions and convictions.

When a theory is enunciated, a statement made, an opinion expressed, we listen to and understand them, but they do not impress themselves on our mind until proved. We analyse and test the statements made, the theories enunciated, the opinions expressed, and if they are correct, we arrive at such judgments that necessarily impress themselves upon our minds and upon those of others. We arrive at conclusions that strike us to be nothing but true. If we act in this way we are said to think logically

or correctly. Logic, therefore, is the science of correct thinking. Its objects are the laws, the necessary and sufficient conditions by which we arrive at a correct judgment, a judgment that must be generally accepted by every normal thinking man.

Under what conditions is a judgment correct? How are we to test its validity and correctness, and make sure that it is not a fallacy?

Such are the questions with which Logic concerns itself. It not only teaches us how we think and must think, but also how we *ought* to think. It analyses correct reasoning and the process by which we arrive at a valid conclusion, and it shows the invalidity and fallacy of thought that does not conform to the rules. Many a man therefore who will readily indulge in the Mephistophelian sneer when referring to Logic—

For this I counsel my young friend
A course of Logic to attend;
Thus will your mind, well trained and high,
In Spanish boots stalk pompously,

is nevertheless a logician to some extent, and performs the logical operation of the mind without reflecting upon the theory of the process. He observes the laws of correct thinking without knowing them, nay, without even being aware of their very existence.

§ 2. If we now examine the nature of thought, we find that its process consists of three operations of the mind. First, we become aware of a sensation, receive an impression, form a concept or name of a thing or of an idea. This is the simple act of apprehension. We then begin to bring two notions or ideas together; we combine or separate them, add or subtract, and thus form a judgment or an assertion. Some such judgments appear to us correct, others invalid; and as we are always striving to arrive at judgments acceptable not only to ourselves but also to others, we endeavour to find reasons, and to prove why a judgment is true or false. For this purpose we compare one assertion with another, we consider the relation of one judgment to another, we argue from the

first statements, which are called "premises," and arrive at a new statement, "the proof," which is termed "conclusion."

Now, there is no need to enter upon the important and much-discussed question whether concepts can exist without words, and in how far is it possible to think without words. It has been and is still a matter of dispute amongst psychologists and logicians, who maintain either that it is possible to think without the aid of language or that thought without language is a mere phantom. Max Müller repeatedly stated and abundantly proved that thought and language are identical.

"What we have been in the habit of calling thought," says he, "is but the reverse of a coin, of which the obverse is articulate sound, whilst the current coin is one and indivisible, neither thought, nor sound, but words." Though his theories are disputed, it is, however, practically admitted that when we reason or infer we perform this operation by means of words, and it is of course generally agreed that we communicate our thoughts by outward sounds or words. We give a name to a thing we have in our mind and express it by a certain word, which is then called a "term." By joining two or more "terms" with a verb, we express an idea or a judgment, which is called a "proposition," or an assertion expressed in words. Proceeding then to justify our assertion, to prove its veracity, or to give reasons for our acceptance or rejection of some one else's statements, we argue, make another statement, infer and draw conclusions. The arguments made up from propositions are called syllogisms. Logic, therefore, as the science of correct thought or reasoning, has to deal with terms, propositions, and syllogisms. The importance of a correct employment of terms is very obvious. How often does it happen that we differ in opinion from each other, that we discuss a matter and apparently dissent, although in reality we agree, and often find it out in the end? The misunderstanding is due to nothing but to a wrong employment, to an ambiguity, to a confused or vague definition of terms. "Define your terms," Voltaire therefore always urged before starting a discussion. A correct knowledge of terms is indispensable

for correct thinking and for the attainment of valid judgments.

§ 3. Now, when we draw a truth or a statement from another truth contained in a proposition, we are said to “infer” or “to move an inference,” and certain laws are to be observed in this operation, which are calculated to prevent us from making mistakes or arriving at false conclusions.

The three primary laws of thought are well known; they are:—

1. The law of identity. Whatever is is, or that everything is identical with itself.
2. The law of contradiction. Nothing can both be and not be.
3. The law of excluded middle. Everything must either be or not be, a thing must either be the one or the other, it must be either yes or no.

By neglecting the laws of correct thinking we certainly make mistakes, fall into erroneous reasoning, without being able to find out where our mistake was made. We have often to go back to the point from which we started in order to discover the point where we deviated from the right path, and consequently arrive at some point other than our intended destination. Such mistakes are called “fallacies.”

In our search for truth we not only endeavour to arrive at a valid result but to arrive at it promptly and by the quickest way. We employ various modes which we deem best and most convenient for our purpose. These modes are called “methods.” It is Logic applied to all sciences in their various departments.

Make good use of your time, for fast
Time flies, and is for ever past;
To make more time for yourself begin
By order—method—discipline.

The ways of procedure or methods are various—Inductive or Deductive, Analytical or Synthetical.

The Inductive or Analytical Method is that which,

proceeding from fact and knowledge gathered by experience, endeavours to establish general principles and universal laws (analytical, from the Greek ἀνάλυσις, analysis, from ἀνά + λύειν = to loose, which means separating or cutting the whole into parts).

The Deductive or Synthetical Method, on the contrary, proceeds from general notions, putting them together and then trying to deduce a result and predict an event. It is called synthetical, from synthesis (the Greek σύν + τιθέναι = to set), or combining or putting together the parts into systematic whole simple notions or ideas, and this explains facts known to us.

The Inductive or Analytical Method is also called *regressive*, for it proceeds regressively in its investigations, from the individual or particular judgment based upon experience, to universal propositions and real principles.

The Deductive or Synthetic Method is called *progressive*, for it proceeds progressively, starting from universal notions, laws, and real principles, and descends to particulars which we know from experience and can control by our senses.

CHAPTER VI

ÆSTHETICS

§ 1. ANOTHER part of Psychology treats of feelings—feelings which are caused by the beautiful and admirable, or by their counterparts, the ugly and contemptible.

There are certain fibres in our senses, especially in the senses of hearing and seeing, by which we are enabled to derive a sensation of pleasure, when listening to certain sounds or looking at certain objects. The numerous spectacles of nature in her glory, splendour, and immensity, a symphony of Beethoven or Mozart, the aspect of a picture or statue, of Titian's Madonna or of the Venus of Milo, the reading or hearing of a beautiful poem, produce in us an agreeable sensation and send a thrill of joy through our hearts. We utter a cry of admiration: "It is beautiful, exquisite; it is harmonious and graceful!" or we remain perfectly silent, finding no words to express our feelings. Although we do not possess the object, yet we derive a pleasure from seeing it, and never cease to admire it; nay, we even seem to discover on every subsequent occasion something new in it. The beautiful produces in us an agreeable sensation, whilst, on the other hand, anything that is the cause of a feeling of pain and disgust we call "ugly." "Whatever is ugly," says Nietzsche, "weakens and troubles man." It reminds him of deterioration, danger, and impotence. Whenever man is depressed, he has a sense of the proximity of something "ugly." Now the beautiful necessarily produces an agreeable feeling, but not everything agreeable is also beautiful. For the

pleasure derived from beauty is the consequence of an impression produced upon our minds through the medium of our senses—not all the senses, however, but only through the so-called higher or intellectual senses, *i.e.* hearing and seeing. A thing agreeable to the touch or smell is not *always* beautiful, whilst there is nothing of the beautiful at all in a delicious fruit *when we eat it*, or in a dish that pleases our palate. We never speak of a *beautiful* taste in an apple, or of a *beautiful* smell in an odour, but only of an *agreeable* one.

§ 2. The “beautiful” is also quite distinct from the “useful”; in fact, the really beautiful thing—that in which our sole pleasure is derived from the contemplation of its beauty or from listening to its harmonious sounds—is, as a rule, useless (useless in the material sense, but probably useful from a moral point of view). The pleasure and enjoyment, therefore, which arise from our contemplation of “beauty” is a disinterested one, free from materialism or desire. It was the German philosopher Kant who first pointed out this disinterestedness and freedom from desire.

Thus the ear and the eye, the two great avenues to the mind, are the special organs that communicate or transmit to the brain, or the nervous centre, all the impressions which we receive from the contemplation of colour, form, shape, and movement in objects, or from the hearing of certain sounds, accompanying the impressions with a feeling of pleasure or pain. This pleasure is called the “æsthetic” pleasure; it is the effect of “beauty,” which addresses itself, through the medium of the senses, to our sentiment, reason, and imagination; warms, elevates, purifies, and ennobles our soul, and is distinguished by the absence of desire, which always seeks possession and must therefore cause a feeling of pain and suffering. The branch of Philosophy or of Psychology which treats of these sentiments and pleasures is “Æsthetics.” A man is pleasantly impressed, but he does not know why; he does not even in most cases inquire into and analyse the cause. The philosophic aim of Æsthetics is to inquire, investigate, and define. The layman feels, but he cannot express his feelings in words or works, as the philosopher

and artist can. The ordinary man only feels, but the others also reflect. In the first it is simply instinct, sentiment, or intuition, which to a certain extent is also shared by the animals; in the others it is reflection and speculation.

§ 3. "Æsthetics" therefore, as it would seem, is the science of Beauty; in fact, it has been defined as such, as "the science of the Beautiful," treating of the feelings, sensations, and pleasures which its aspect produces. But this definition is, if not entirely wrong, at least not quite correct. When we speak of a military science we do not mean by it the science of victory, but that of military tactics, which should lead to victory but might lead to defeat. Æsthetics therefore has to treat not only of the Beautiful, but also of the Ugly.

The Beautiful produces a feeling of love and attraction, of pleasure and enjoyment; the Ugly, a feeling of disgust. The majestic beauty of nature, on the other hand, the idea of the myriads of orbs revolving in space, scattered like so many grains of sand in the desert, gigantic mountains, the vast ocean, the rising and setting of the sun—all these we call beautiful, and yet there is a certain feeling of sadness attached to the contemplation, a sentiment of melancholy, and one might almost say a feeling of pleasurable pain. It is because we are struck by the infinity. We are no longer in presence of the Beautiful, but of the Sublime, which at first causes a feeling of depression and then one of elevation.

§ 4. To the Sublime is opposed the Ludicrous, which is caused by some incongruity, or contrast, or some sense of enforced solemnity and dignified demeanour. Professor Sully, in his latest book, "An Essay on Laughter," says: "The terms laughable and ludicrous may be employed interchangeably up to a certain point without risk of confusion. At the same time it is well to note that the second is used in stricter sense than the first. The term ludicrous seems to denote particularly what is not only a universal object of laughter, but an object of that more intellectual kind of laughter which implies a clear perception of relations. Closely connected with this emphasis on an intellectual element in the meaning of the term

ludicrous is its tendency to take on an ideal connotation, to mark off what we deem worthy of laughter. There, as in the case of the other objects of an æsthetic sentiment, there is a half-disguised reference to the regulative principles of art."

The Tragic, again, produces pleasure coupled with a feeling of pity: it is a pleasure tempered with something like pain, yet there is pleasure in it, because our moral sentiment plays a part in it. The study of Æsthetics has to treat of all these sensations. Hence Æsthetics is also the science of feelings, sentiments, and emotions. "

It defines the concepts of the Beautiful and Ugly, of the Sublime, the Comic, and the Ludicrous. It tries to discover the reason which makes a thing appear beautiful or ugly. It also treats of beauty in nature as well as of beauty in the works of man, *i.e.* art, of beauty in concrete as well as in abstract things. It is therefore the connecting link between Philosophy and Art. Philosophically it is a part of Psychology.

§ 5. Whence do the æsthetic feelings arise? Is there anything like beauty in itself, or do the æsthetic feelings depend upon what we find in the objects, upon how the things appear to us individually, so that an object or sound may please one but displease or jar upon another? What are the features of an object and the movements of a sound that make it appear beautiful and harmonious, producing an impression of delight? Is there one particular ingredient common to all things that are beautiful? Such are some of the questions with which a study of Æsthetics occupies itself.

"The first ideas of beauty," says Professor Bain, in "Emotions and Will," "formed by the mind are in all probability derived from colours. Long before the infants receive any pleasure from the beauties of form or of motion, their eye may be caught or delighted with brilliant colouring, or with splendid imagination. I am inclined, too, to suspect that, in the judgment of a peasant, this ingredient of beauty predominates over every other, even in his estimate of female form."

This accounts for the fact that primitive races or individuals that are still very low in the scale of mental

development are attracted by gaudy colours in inanimate or animate objects.

Minds little developed, that have not yet come to their self-consciousness, that have not yet reached the phase of turning their gaze into themselves, are attracted either by strong (red and yellow) colours, or by the variety, whilst the refined and cultured are drawn towards uniform shades and milder hues. It is the unity of the idea in the variety of appearances that they admire.

Das einfach Schoene wird der Kenner loben,
Verziertes sagt der Menge zu.

—SCHILLER.

This power of distinction and appreciation of beauty is what we commonly call "taste." It is the capacity of man to feel æsthetic pleasure, a faculty with which man is more or less gifted and which culture and civilization develop in the individual as well as in the social group, in a lower or higher degree.

§ 6. The same sound, shape, or form does not produce the same effect upon every listener or spectator. It is due, in the first place, to the fact that the nervous fibres are not equally constructed in every individual and that the variety of temperament, education, customs, and habits is immense; and in the second place to the divergence in the phase of mental evolution. Beauty appeals not only to the imagination but also to the intellect. The unaided senses perceive the movements, lines, sounds, or colours, but only in their singularity; thought and consciousness unite them to a harmonious whole. Here also lies the difference between man and animal. The animal sees the aggregation of colours in Raphael's Madonna, it hears the sound of a poem, but it perceives no love, feels no passion in it.

This is the reason why one man grasps or understands the beauty of a thing in nature or in art, a symphony or a canvas, while the other remains indifferent, why one is enthusiastic and the other bored. One audience will enjoy a play of Ibsen or Maeterlinck, whilst another will feel highly gratified by the spectacle of a Drury Lane

pantomime. It is also for the same reason that the lady of aristocratic society prefers mild colours and dark, or at least uniform shades, whilst her negro servant has a predilection for red and yellow. The one has *taste*, the other has not, or what she has is still at a very low degree of differentiation and evolution.

§ 7. The æsthetic pleasure manifests itself very often in an active, creative manner. There is a desire deeply rooted in the breast of man to express what he feels in line or sound or form. He must speak, he must produce. A man who cannot speak, write, or compose *will* often attempt to do so; he thinks he feels the need of doing so without, however, possessing the power; but a man who has the power *must* exercise it. "There is no mute and inglorious Milton," Carlyle said; and one may add: There is no silent, passive Beethoven or Mozart, no contemplative but unproductive Michael Angelo or Raphael.

The impression—physical, intellectual, or moral—received and thus expressed in a few lines, words, or sounds, in painting, sculpture, architecture, poetry, or music, is Art. Art is the faculty of expressing a sentiment or a feeling in an external form. Thus the æsthetic feeling, passive in the ordinary man, is active in the artist; the superabundance of strength results in action, in a reflex power of creation. By means of stone or colours, of language or sound, the artist expresses also that which is invisible to us; he expresses the ideal. Speaking to our mind by aid of the senses, he elevates our soul and ennobles us, calling forth the highest sentiments and actions. Art not only speaks to the heart, but also to the mind—in a word, to the inmost recesses of the soul, to all human faculties. The artist gathers the characteristics of a sentiment, idea, or a physiognomy, putting clearly and vividly before us what we could not understand before. The artist sees more than the ordinary man; he conceives an ideal and produces it. Now, is art imitative only, reproducing as faithfully as possible sensible appearances? Has it any object or aim, or is it only for its own sake: *l'art pour l'art* (art for art's sake)? Is it independent of the moral sense, or must it be in harmon; with it? Such are the questions that occupy philosophers

and have given rise to various theories—Realism or Naturalism, and Idealism.

§ 8. Naturalism is the theory which maintains that the aim and purport of art consist in the imitation of nature, or at least in trying to approach as nearly as possible to nature. Others, again, think that if the artist imitates nature, he must, however, not do it too literally. He conceives an ideal and produces it, blending reality with his own thoughts and sentiments. He copies but also modifies nature at the same time ; he *selects* and *recombines*, thus bringing out immanent meanings and interpretations. This theory is called Idealism. A work of art thus manifesting some essential feature, or salient character, or great idea becomes clearer than reality, and consequently also more impressive upon the mind than reality. Penetrated with a sentiment, the artist tries to transform it into a reflex power of action, and creates a work not as it is, but as he conceives it.

Another question is whether art has to serve ethical purposes, or whether it stands above morality. Some, like Ruskin, maintain that art has only to be moral. The great and generous task of the artist consists in making us participate in his noble sentiments. Morality alone and nothing else can be demanded of a work of art. Others, again, maintain that a work of art need only be beautiful. Beauty lies in form ; the content is a matter of indifference : it may be vice or crime. Some of these æsthetes even go so far as to affirm that “Æsthetics are higher than Ethics.” “To discuss the beauty of a thing is the finest point to which we can arrive. Even a colour-sense is more important in the development of the individual than a sense of right and wrong.”

§ 9. The study of Æsthetics is older than its name. Etymologically, the word has a narrower sense than is given to it. It was first made use of by Baumgarten (1714-1762), a disciple of Wolff, the German philosopher, who was the originator of the study of Æsthetics as a separate branch of Philosophy. He derived the word from the Greek αἰσθητικός = *aisthetikos* (from αἰσθάνεσθαι = to perceive), or that which is perceived by the senses. He called this science Æsthetics, as signifying sensation and

perception, and applied it to the Beautiful, the Beautiful, according to his views, being obscurely perceived by the senses, and not by reason, like Logic. And thus the term *Æsthetics* remained, although it covers a much wider field than its etymology suggests.

The Greek philosophers, however, had already discussed the subject of Beauty. Socrates, according to Xenophon,¹ held the idea of the Ethical to be predominant, and the effect was of importance for him. The Beautiful was for him identical with the Useful. Plato, in his "*Hippias Major*,"² considered the Beautiful identical with the Divine and with the idea of the Good. Beauty, therefore, is something abstract, absolute, and unchangeable. He conceives it as a being apart from any reality. The soul had enjoyed the aspect of eternal beauty in its natal preterrestrial life, and therefore man, when reminded of it by the aspect of a thing that possesses something of this eternal beauty, becomes enthusiastic. Plato thought that beauty is inherent in a thing and independent of our senses, whilst the moderns, especially since the doctrine of evolution, maintain that beauty in itself is nothing but what our sensations and senses make it. According to Plato, there is an absolute beauty in which all things participate. Aristotle, in his work on Poetry, has given an analysis of the theory of art. In the Middle Ages no interest was taken in speculations concerning *Æsthetics*. The celebrated common sense of the Englishman has made itself felt in the English School of Philosophy and also in æsthetic theories. In Philosophy the attention of the English thinkers was directed towards the empirical; they speculated not upon the thing itself, but upon the impression it produced on the human

¹ The reader must bear in mind that Socrates left no writings. We are indebted for our knowledge of him to his two pupils Xenophon and Plato, who have given accounts of the master in their own words. Xenophon's data are contained in his "*Memorabilia*" and Plato's in his "*Dialogues*." In reading Plato's "*Dialogues*" it is, however, often difficult to say what is purely reported from Socrates and what is originated by Plato himself.

² It is doubtful, however, whether Plato really wrote the "*Hippias Major*."

senses and on the disposition and nature of man. Æsthetics was therefore a branch of Philosophy that would naturally interest them. English æsthetic philosophers begin by inquiring into the impression which the contemplation of a thing produces in us, and then try to arrive at conclusions as to the qualities an object must possess so as to produce such an æsthetic effect.

Locke, Cudworth, Home, Hogarth, Burke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Reid are the philosophers who have developed theories in this branch of philosophic inquiry. In Germany, after Winckelmann, Lessing, and Herder, Kant, in his "Critique of Pure Reason," maintained that we must first investigate not the essence of the Beautiful but our own individual judgment and taste. It was also Kant who first observed, as has already been pointed out, that the æsthetic pleasure must be a disinterested one. The poet Fr. Schiller developed Kant's theories. He first held that the sense of beauty is limited to man only. This theory has, however, been proved a fallacy by modern science of evolution. Schiller's second idea that the origin of art is to be found in the tendency for play has recently been treated at large. Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Fœchner in Germany, Taine in France, Ruskin in England, Heiberg in Denmark, and Bielinsky in Russia, are names that can only be mentioned in this treatise.

CHAPTER VII

ETHICS

§ 1. WHILST Psychology proper only considers man as he is and his thoughts and actions as they are, Ethics deals with questions of how he ought to be, how he should act, how shape and form his life. Man is endowed with many faculties and powers, he has many inclinations and desires, many and various are his wants. He is not only an ever-acting being, always engaged in doing something, but he is also a free agent. He is entirely master of his own actions. He can regulate his will and actions in any way he pleases. He can behave towards his fellow-men as he pleases. He can help or harm them. With regard to himself, he can be industrious or lazy, he can work or enjoy himself. But volition and action in man imply an aim; without an aim or purpose volition is impossible. Ethics therefore asks, What ought to be the aim and purpose of man which he is striving to attain by his actions, and towards which he directs his will? That wonderful power of thought which enables man to investigate and inquire into his essence, enables him to ask for and find the aim of his existence, to establish rules and laws for his conduct and actions, to consider some of them as good and others as bad. In order to find these rules he must think, and the totality of these thoughts is called the science of Ethics. It is therefore the study that inquires into the sources and motives, aims and laws of our actions. It deals with voluntary human actions and their sources, with moral judgments, sentiments, and their manifestations in life.

§ 2. What are the motives that prompt us to act thus and not otherwise in certain circumstances? Whence do we derive the knowledge of good and evil, and whither does this knowledge tend to lead us? To these questions Ethics gives the answers. There appears to be in us a voice that seems to *tell* us how we should act, what is right or wrong, what is good or bad, what is advantageous and disadvantageous, what is moral and what is immoral. This voice is called conscience. It is a sort of innate feeling, independent of outside authority. Long before the problems of morality were philosophically treated, the moral sense existed and impelled men to act in certain ways. It had its roots either in the innate feelings, in the religious conceptions, or in the decisions of a group of men who, from motives of practical interest, made certain regulations for the common welfare. It was a sort of conventional morality, and owed its origin to practical interest, subject to outside law. The regulations became sanctioned by usage and afterwards obligatory. They developed into customs and habits, which it was moral to observe and immoral to infringe. "Custom," says Th. Ziegler in "Social Ethics," "is the established conformity of arbitrarily determined actions, developed in a certain circle, especially in a racial or natural community, in a rank or clan of society, to infringe which becomes an offence against morality, to exercise it a virtue."

§ 3. After having arranged, collected, and classified the customs and habits of nations, Moral Philosophy, as a science, not content with mere facts, asks the Whence, Why, and Whither.

It first explains the customs and regulations, examines them and approves or condemns them. Hence also the term Ethics, from the Greek word *ἠθικά*, derived from *ἦθος*¹ = character. Just as languages existed before grammar had begun to establish rules, so moral data existed before philosophical investigations of morality.

* ¹ Ethics, however, has also the same reference to the externals of custom or usage from the Greek word *ἔθος*, custom, which is equivalent to the Latin *mos*, pl. *mores*, a custom or habit.

Proceeding from these moral data the science tried to establish rules by which actions should be guided.

Ethics therefore, as distinguished from theoretical Philosophy, which merely inquires into what is, has been, and will be, is also practical Philosophy, trying to determine what *ought* to be. It is the science of human conduct and of human habit.

§ 4. Even superficial reflection on the slightest experience suffices to teach us that man must not only act as he wishes and wills, or as he *can*, but that, on the contrary, he must very often refrain from doing what he pleases himself, that he must "submit his will to the will of others," that he must therefore regulate his *volition* and shape it according to circumstances.

The history of nations shows us also that men have had and still have diverse opinions as to what is good or bad, moral or immoral. An action is good in one case and bad in another, it is moral in a certain locality or at a certain time, whilst it will be condemned at another time and in a different locality. Ethics, therefore, has to define the concepts of Good and Bad, to investigate whether they change and evolve with time, or whether there are certain immutable moral concepts for all ages and all men.

§ 5. To sum up. Ethics furnishes us with a clear consciousness of our moral life, establishes and fixes the means of testing the validity of moral ideas embodied in customs that have prevailed and still prevail, helps us to grasp the ultimate principles, to justify, correct, or cast aside regulations, and find the standard of morality which will enable us to judge and guide our inclinations and actions. Its object is not only to understand human strivings, modes of conduct and their effects upon life, but also to guide and influence the human will, to discover the moral *raison d'être*, to determine the value of things in so far as they depend upon our will, and to advise us how to mould and shape our life, how to fashion our deeds so as to realise the ideals of life for our own good, welfare, and perfection, and for those of our fellow-men. The reader will remember that in the introductory chapter I said: "The truth gained (by philosophical speculation) is not confined to the death-kingdom of abstract specula-

tion, but ultimately applies to real, practical life." I therefore add here, in the words of Professor Paulsen in his "System of Ethics," that "the ultimate aim impelling men to meditate upon the nature of the universe will always be the desire to reach some conclusion concerning the meaning, the source, and the goal of their own lives. The origin and aim of all Philosophy is consequently to be sought in Ethics."

§ 6. It has been pointed out that Socrates had directed the attention of Greek thought to the study of man. Pre-Socratic Philosophy was directed towards the material world. Yet utterances containing moral reflections, rules for conduct and life, clothed in the garb of proverbs and aphorisms, are scattered throughout the works of the poets. In fact, the moral sense begins in Greece with poetry. The poets were—as Paul Janet, the French philosopher has pointed out—the first theologians of the Greek religion, and were also the first preachers. Speculation proper upon moral truths, in Western thought, only began with Plato and Aristotle, especially with Aristotle. But neither of them had invented morality. Long before them the human mind had learned to judge one action thus and another otherwise, to distinguish between good and bad, moral and immoral deeds. The power of reflection merely tried to collect the data and facts and inquired after the motives and reasons. Why was it wrong to kill and steal, why immoral to tell a lie, and moral to be truthful?

Greek Moral Philosophy or Ethics starts from the view that there must be a highest good after which man is striving, a good desired for itself, not as a means for the attainment of something else, a good obtainable by human action, and in view of which this action should be regulated. This good is happiness (*eudaimonia*), which is aimed at in conduct as the ultimate purpose, and to which all other purposes are subordinated. Hence the term Eudæmonism, or the theory that "happiness is the chief good for man and the ethical end of his conduct." Having admitted that the greatest individual happiness is the highest good, Greek moral philosophers then ask: What is the greatest individual happiness, and what are

"the means most likely to attain it? To these questions various answers have been given. Socrates, who had refused to occupy himself with speculations concerning the origin and composition of the universe, but who interested himself in things human, taught that the greatest happiness consisted in an understanding of the True, in knowledge. Knowledge is virtue, and can be acquired by study. Nobody, so Socrates is represented as teaching, would willingly act in an unjust manner or choose the wrong way if he knew the right one. If he does act wrongly or unjustly, it is on account of his ignorance—ignorance of what is good for him. The wise man alone who has reached the goal of knowledge is virtuous and happy, regardless of public opinion, of tradition and custom, knowledge being the ultimate aim of a man's action and identical with the good and with virtue. But virtue and justice, based upon mere habit and education, without knowledge and reflection, are a groping in the dark which will incidentally lead to the right track but give no inner satisfaction. It is necessary to go a step further, and to attempt to find a precise definition of the Good. So, in Plato's "Gorgias" and "Republic," Kallicles and Thrasymachos maintain that the Good is what pleases us and the Just is that which we have in our power to attain. Plato, who claims to be repeating the teachings of Socrates, denies this. For him Goodness and Justice—identical with the idea of the Divine—are absolute and independent of opinion. Plato's system of Ethics is metaphysical. The art of conduct, he taught, consists in man's striving to bring into his private and public life *that* harmony, beauty, and order which are the fundamental qualities and characteristics of the great Cosmos, to imitate the Good which the soul, part of the great soul of the universe, had looked upon face to face in its pre-natal state. This is obtained by practising the four virtues: Courage, Temperance, and above all, Wisdom and Justice. Justice reaches its consummation in the organization of the State, the ideal of which Plato has sketched in the "Republic" and in "Laws."

Aristotle, "the eternal prince of all true thinkers," as Auguste Comte calls him in his "Catechisme Positiviste,"

starts in his Ethics, like Plato, with the question : "What is the highest good for man? what is his ultimate aim and purpose?" Man alone, so he taught, in the great mass of organic being, possesses not merely the faculty of feeling and desire, but also that of understanding. In sensibility and perception he resembles the animal, but in reason and understanding he is like God. This combination of animal and intellectual faculties makes him a moral being; for morality is the harmonious co-operation of the animal and intellectual elements, the exercise of human powers and actions under the control of reason. Subject to morality is not the contemplative man who only lives in thought, but he who is engaged in action, and upon whom desire and excitement exercise their influence. In order to choose the right and proper direction, he must employ his powers of judgment, reason, and free will.

This harmony between human will and reason or intellect produces the ethical virtues or happiness, the highest good, man's aim in life. But whilst Socrates held that virtue is only the result of reason and not of education and habit, that it consists in perfect practical wisdom or moral insight, Aristotle thought that education, practice, and habit were also necessary. He defines ethical virtues as "a settled and fixed habit, the outcome of practice, formed under the rule and guidance of reason and intellect." Other successors of the great masters developed certain aspects of their doctrines. Two schools, that of the Stoics and that of the Epicureans, need especial mention.

The Stoic School was founded by Zeno of Citium, who taught in the *Stoa Poikile* (*Stoa Poikile*), the Painted Porch or Hall,¹ whence the name Stoics and Stoicism.

Proceeding from the Socratic disregard for tradition and public opinion, and from the predominance of reason over desire, Zeno taught that virtue is all sufficient, and that the wise man, wrapping himself in the beggar's cloak, proud as a king, leads a life in accordance with nature, independent and free. Unable to change nature, he submits to it

¹ The great hall in the Agora at Athens, adorned with fresco paintings.

joyfully; while the fool, in his struggle against it, loses his strength and falls a victim, exhausted and crushed. Nothing affects the Stoic; he is resigned because everything, as he believes, is decreed by nature, which is Providence and goodwill.

Epicurus (337 or 341—270 B.C.), who may be styled a *Socratic Voltaire* or a *Voltairean Socrates*, taught that the sole good of man is pleasure, which understanding helps him to procure. Epicurus, like other Hellenistic thinkers, admits that morality and happiness are identical, and that the art of conduct is also the art that teaches us how to procure a state of satisfaction for the individual. Morality for Epicurus is nothing else but a right understanding of the individual interest, a refined egotism. Self-denial and self-sacrifice are not based upon man's acting *against* his nature, against his desire for pleasure deeply rooted in the human breast, but are due to his power of reflection. As a reasoning being he is capable of renouncing immediate pleasurable sensations, in order to enjoy greater ones later on. Passing pleasures and voluptuousness are nothing in comparison with pleasures that endure—pleasures of the mind—which procure a state of content, arming man against the tribulations and vicissitudes of life.

As some pleasures often lead to pain, the desire for pleasure must be regulated by prudence, from which all other virtues follow, for health of body and tranquillity of mind are the consummation of happiness in life. "We cannot live a life of pleasure which is not also a life of prudence, honour, and justice; nor lead a life of prudence, honour, and justice which is not also a life of pleasure." In order to obtain permanent pleasure, we sometimes even undergo momentary pain and suffering. By pleasure Epicurus does not mean the sensations which vanish like the moment which procures them, but that state of deep peace and perfect contentment in which we feel secure against the storms of life.

The human spirit, however, could not long be satisfied with Philosophy. Religion took its place. Instead of the poet and philosopher of Greek antiquity, the saint of Christianity came. Christianity wrought the greatest

revolution that had ever come over mankind, and caused an entire change in the department of thought. Greek doctrines could not stand against its sway. In the domain of Ethics, or morals, almost all the old pagan teachings were abandoned. "It was," as Nietzsche said, "a complete revaluation of values."

Christianity, however, has, to a certain extent, made universal the teachings of Judaism and spread the moral seed of the Old Testament over the Western world. Jewish Ethics are in their origin theological. Their fundamental principles are theistic. Morality in Judaism has never been considered otherwise than as an emanation and result of the divine order and law, the fulfilment of divine command. Man has to observe certain rules and laws regulating his conduct, but the lawgiver is God. Morally good and pleasing to God, divine ordinance and ethical law are inseparable conceptions. A thing is not, however, moral because God has ordained it, but on the contrary God has ordained and enjoined it because it is moral. For morality alone is the vital centre and the world-purpose. "The Hebrews," says Herman Lotze, the modern German philosopher, in his famous work "Microcosmus," "seem to us, among the theocratically governed nations of the East, as sober people among drunkards, but to antiquity they seemed dreamers among working folk. Moral obligations, the consciousness of which is everywhere developed by social action and reaction, appear here (in Judaism), consolidated into a will of God, which has to be fulfilled and glorified, not only by the individual in inward disposition and outward works, but also by the whole nation in the theocratically regulated life of the community."

The great fundamental principles are love of and obedience to God, and love of man, principles that require the exercise of such virtues as justice and benevolence. While Greek Ethics considered the perfection of the individual to be the ultimate aim of man, obtainable by a thorough exercise of his natural powers and capacities, and culminating in "happiness," Christian Ethics demanded the striving after pure morality in thought and action, the absolute power of the spirit over the flesh and over natural

desires. The spirituality, however, led to a denial of the flesh and a retirement from the world, to a renunciation and a contempt of the natural life and its interests, to asceticism, vows of poverty, celibacy, and submission to a cult of bodily pain and suffering—in a word, to an “unnatural life.” Another idea entirely novel is the doctrine of “salvation by grace.” Man, being sinful by nature, is utterly incapable of reaching the good by his own strength and exertion. He obtains salvation only by grace, grace which is dispensed by the Church in an arbitrary manner. Thus the original teachings and doctrines of the Founder of Christianity have been degraded by the mistakes of His disciples. A higher importance is now ascribed in both modern Christianity and Judaism to ceremonies than to moral and ethical purity of life in thought and action, which they were originally intended to symbolize.

§ 7. Modern ethical thought, taking its origin from Martin Luther, the courageous monk at Wittenberg, is characterized by a tendency towards “reality.” It recognised that the aim of man consisted in the manifestations of his powers and faculties in the practical life, that the field of his moral activity was the world. Proceeding from this tendency, modern Moral Philosophy, especially the English School, gradually separated Ethics from Theology, or Morality from Religion, and established it as a philosophical science. Locke,⁹ Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith in England and Scotland; Spinoza, Leibniz, and Wolff in Germany were most productive in this field of Philosophy. The questions they raised and the problems they discussed will be mentioned in a subsequent chapter, treating of the Ethical Schools. Kant, in his “Critique of Pure Reason” (1788), gave a new direction to the study of Ethics. He maintained that man bears in himself the source of law and the moral spirit. This moral spirit is independent of legislation or any dictation from without. This “autonomous” moral law is known by the name of the “categorical imperative.” Only when submitting our will to this moral spirit within us, to the categorical imperative, even against our inclination, do we fulfil our

duty and act morally. To Kant, "the executioner of Deism," succeeded Fichte, the forerunner of the modern Socialism; Hegel, the collectionist and reactionist; Schleiermacher, the Janus-headed Christian and philosopher; Schopenhauer, the Nirvana-intoxicated pessimist; and the misunderstood Friedrich Nietzsche, poet-philosopher and aristocrat-radical in the domain of modern thought; and Darwin, John Stuart Mill, and Herbert Spencer continued to develop ethical and moral problems and set forth theories of their own.

CHAPTER VIII

SOCIOLOGY

§ 1. "It is not good for man to be alone," and even the charms of Paradise cannot make up for the ennui of solitude. It is contrary to human nature to live alone. Man is dependent upon his fellow-men alike in his natural wants and in the necessities of life. Therefore he associates himself with other beings, seeks acquaintances and forms alliances. We can trace the history of man to the remotest periods of antiquity; but always and everywhere we find him shunning solitude and living in company with others. He lives in social groups, in families, clans, communities, tribes, or nations, and engages with others in various forms of activity. What, then, are the conditions and forms under which men associate with others? What are the forms of activity in which man engages in common with other men? How do men influence one another? What are the forms of their relations? And, finally, what are the laws by which the development of man's social life is regulated? This study—the most interesting for man, as Comte declared—is termed "Sociology." Other branches of Philosophy are concerned with the nature of the material universe and the problems it suggests (like Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy); or (in Anthropology) with man as an individual, inquiring into his origin and relations to the animal creations; or (in Ethics and Psychology) into the work of the spirit of man, as a conscious being, and into his efforts to know himself; while Sociology is concerned with man in his relations to the social world into which he is born, and deals with the

phenomena to which such a living-together gives rise. It is that department of thought which embraces the science of society and association, or of associated humanity—that is, humanity so far as it is united, so far as it is associated, consisting of individual units that are somehow bound together. It comprehends the whole of the human species as it is, has been, and will be. It explains the process of human association and the interaction of social forces, and having discovered the law that underlies the development of these social forces, tries to regulate them for the future. Sociology, we may say, endeavours to discover the laws, principles, and essences of the social phenomena, and avails itself of the knowledge thus gained to benefit humanity.

§ 2. The term Sociology was invented by Auguste Comte. It is a compound of the Latin word *socius*, society, and the Greek *λόγος* (*logos*), science. The science of Sociology, however, existed before its name. It was, like all other sciences at their early stage, not purely theoretical, but also directed to practical questions and known under the name of "Politics." Plato laid down his ideas and ideals of the State and the forms of government in his two works, "Laws" and the "Republic." He defined the ethical aim of the State as he conceived it. Aristotle did not believe in the ideal state and the golden age dreamt of by Plato. In his "Politics" he endeavoured to give an analysis of the then existing forms of government, dividing them, according to the number of rulers, into: Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Polity. Proceeding from the idea that "man is by nature a social or political animal"—i.e. that both in the primitive and in the advanced state of development he cannot live isolated, but must live in social groups—Aristotle considered the organization of the State as the product of nature. "The analysis," says Comte, "by which he refuted the dangerous fancies of Plato and his imitators about community of property, evidences a rectitude, a sagacity, and a strength, which, in their application to such subjects, have been rarely equalled and never surpassed."

• Roman philosophical speculation added nothing to the political theories of Greece. The Middle Ages, dominated

exclusively by the influence of religion and occupied with theological problems, had no time for sociological questions. During the times of the Renaissance, however, special interest was again taken in them. The questions and problems of "natural rights" had already been raised by the philosophers and lawyers of antiquity, as evinced in Cicero's statement: "Universal conduct is the law of nature," i.e. that in every matter the consent of all is to be considered as the law of nature, or in Ulpian's, the Roman jurist's, distinction between *jus naturale* (natural right) and *jus gentium* (law of nations). During the Renaissance these questions passed out of the region of theoretical speculation into that of practical politics. Hugo Grotius was the first to start the question of natural and conventional rights, and was thus the father of the study called "Philosophy of Law."

After him, Thomas Hobbes—who, in his metaphysical and ethical views ("Treatise of Liberty and Necessity") stated that man, like all creatures, was subject to the law of necessity, to fate, or to the will of God, and that interest was the supreme judge in morals as in everything else—applied these doctrines also to politics. For him the state of nature is the state of war of all against all, the *bellum omnium contra omnes*, or the struggle for existence, where "might" makes "right." For the sake of self-preservation, however, and in order to put an end to the conflict, to mitigate the state of nature by association, men entered into a sort of contract among themselves and invented the State. The State is only the means of protecting the life and property of individuals; but for the individual the will of the State must be the supreme law. Only at the cost of an absolute obedience on the part of the subject, will the State be able to attain its aim. Hobbes is thus the founder of the so-called "contract theory."

Montesquieu, in his "Greatness and Decline of the Romans" and in his "Spirit of Law," maintains that political phenomena are subject to invariable laws, like all other phenomena of nature. "He conceived," says Comte "natural laws as the basis of social speculation and action, whilst other able men were talking about the

absolute and indefinite power of legislators, when armed with due authority, to modify at will the State." Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in his "Contrat Social," agrees with Hobbes, that the State is the result of a contract among men.

CHAPTER IX

HISTORICAL SKETCH ; OR, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

§ 1. It does not enter into the scope of this book to put philosophical problems within the framework of history. It is intended to convey to the cultured reader a general knowledge of the rudiments of Philosophy and its problems. It will, however, not be amiss to add a brief historical sketch showing the gradual development of philosophical problems from the times of the Ionian philosophers to those of the twentieth century, A.D. The sketch will necessarily be as brief as possible. Without entering into the details of the philosophical problems discussed and investigated by the numerous thinkers, it will only trace in broad lines the characteristic features peculiar to various epochs and constituting their essence. It will therefore be quite impossible even to attempt to give an account of all the important and comprehensive philosophical conceptions and systems, or to enumerate all the schools and their founders. The subject-matter is so enormous, the material so infinitely complex, that the attempt at details would miss the aim of this sketch, viz. to give the reader some idea of the existing order and unity in the bewildering mass. The history of Philosophy cannot be compared with the history of other sciences and branches of knowledge. In other branches of knowledge the field of research is fixed, and consequently no extraordinary difficulties are encountered in tracing the gradual development over a determined and limited field. The building up of knowledge upon some basis is also very obvious in all sciences. This is not the case, however, in

philosophy. Here the problems are not only manifold, but also different in their kind. There is no subject-matter common to all periods, and, what is more, every new thinker seems, instead of building upon what his predecessor had achieved, to begin to solve his newly formulated problem *ab ovo*, as if the other systems had scarcely existed. (Cf. Windelband, p. 9.) On the other hand, the development of ideas and the formulation of beliefs and doctrines are always accomplished through the thinking of *individual* personalities, who, although rooted with their thought in the ideas of an historical period, always add a particular element by their own individuality. This factor is of much more importance in Philosophy than in the positive sciences. It is self-evident that in abstract problems, in the formation of a *Weltanschauung*, character and experience, activity in life, birth and education will play a very great part and imprint their mark upon a man's trend of thought. From all that has been said it necessarily follows that the history of Philosophy is nothing but a sum-total uniting, in chronological order, all the fundamental conceptions of great *personalities* and their views of the world and judgments of life; embodying a variety of single movements of thought. Nevertheless, there are not only to be traced order and unity, but also growth and development in the history of Philosophy. As thought proceeds, as humanity advances and evolves, as knowledge accumulates, ideas become richer. The problems might occur over and over again, but they are not treated in the same way. The horizon of human understanding is widened; new questions spring up, new problems are formulated, new answers given. Points of interest unknown to a preceding period are discovered by thinkers living in a later epoch. Each historical period also has a certain peculiar feature of its own, and even a superficial glance will convince the reader that the problems become more and more elaborate and consequently more complicated, as culture and civilization advance in just proportion with the mental and intellectual development of humanity. In regard to the nature of Philosophy it can be divided into the following great periods, each stamped with its own characteristic feature:—

1. The Philosophy of the Greeks.
2. Hellenistic Roman Philosophy.
3. Mediæval Philosophy.
4. Modern Philosophy.

§ 2. Although the Greeks themselves often traced their philosophy to the wisdom of the Egyptian priests, and although it is quite certain that in various branches of science, namely, in mathematics, astronomy, and medicine, Greek thought was influenced by the civilization of the Orient and especially by that of Egypt, it is nevertheless beyond doubt that the origin of Philosophy is the outcome of the Hellenic spirit and bears the impress of Hellenic speculation. Reflection upon the world and its phenomena, upon the origin and purpose of the existence of man, is as old as human thought itself. Man had speculated upon the meaning of things long before the time of the Greeks; a considerable development of knowledge took place in Egypt and Chaldea. Before Greek speculation could flourish, a considerable mass of detailed knowledge had been collected among the Babylonians and Egyptians. Those peoples of antiquity were not wanting either in abundance of information on single subjects, or in general views of the universe. The Greeks made use of that material and information afterwards. "Supported on the shoulders of Egypt and Babylon, the genius of Greece could take wing without check or restraint, and could venture on a flight that was to lead it to the highest attainable goals."¹ Among the Oriental nations, however, information was gained in connection with practical needs, and, in consequence of the peculiar restraint of the Oriental mind, it lacked the initiative activity of individuals; among the Greeks was developed the scientific, independent, and self-conscious work of intelligence, seeking knowledge methodically for its own sake. (Cf. Windelband, p. 23.) Pythagoras, Democritus, Plato, and others had visited Egypt and Asia Minor, and had made use of the information obtained; but the scientific development of Philosophy is a peculiarity of the Greek mind. Plato points out that the characteristic

¹ Gomperz, "Greek Thinkers," I. 44 (translated by Laurie Magnus).

trait of the Greeks is investigation, while that of the Egyptians and Phœnicians is love of gain; he speaks highly of the technical abilities of the latter, of their political institutions, but not of their philosophical doctrines. (Brandis, Ch. A., "Geschichte der Entwicklungen der griech. Philosophie," p. 13.)

§ 3. Three periods can easily be distinguished in Greek Philosophy, showing a gradual intellectual evolution which is in accordance not only with the general state of Greek culture and civilization, but also with the natural process which the human desire for knowledge undergoes. Those periods are: (1) the cosmological, (2) the anthropological, (3) the systematic. The first attempts of Greek Philosophy were occupied with the only world which man can present clearly to himself, *i.e.* the world of nature.

The first Greek philosophers were physicists bringing their hypotheses to bear upon the natural processes and the general course of the world's development. From questions of practical life the reflections of individuals extended themselves to the knowledge of nature. "Greek science," says Windelband, "devoted all the freshness of youthful joy and knowledge primarily to the problems of nature, and in this work stamped out fundamental conceptions, or Forms of Thought, for apprehending the external world." Thus the chief interest of Philosophy was concentrated upon physical, astronomical, and geographical questions, particularly upon the great elementary phenomena. Yet gradually, the explanation not only of concrete physical processes but also of the idea which is in the background of the intellectual formulation of these processes was attempted. The central idea on which the philosophical theories turn is the concept of *change*; it involves one of the most fundamental problems with which metaphysics has to deal. The fact that things of experience change into one another furnished the first motive for reflection, and the first Greek philosophers endeavoured to find formulæ for this universal mutability of things, and for the sudden change of opposites into each other. (Windelband, p. 31.)

Philosophy asked for the abiding ground of all the changes, which experiences all the transformations, from which all individual things arise, and into which they become again transformed (p. 32). The question was clearly formulated: "What is the original ground of things, which outlasts all temporal change, and how does it change itself into these particular things, or change these things back into itself?" Out of the efforts to solve this question and determine the nature of the one world-ground, cosmic matter, world-stuff (*Weltstoff*), arose the various theories of the first Greek philosophers, like those of Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, the Eleatic School, and the Pythagoreans. Various conceptions like those of Being and Becoming, cosmic matter and cognition were formed.

§ 4. Gradually, however, Greek thought and philosophical research turned their gaze inward and made human action their study. Nature-knowledge, which had hitherto formed the subject-matter of Philosophy, was lost sight of, and the inner activities of man, his ideation and volition, the process of man's thought and will, and the manner in which ideas and volitions arise were investigated. At the same time the question arose whether there is *anything universally valid*, whether there is anything true and right and good in itself, independently and beyond the individual opinions. Thus this period, which is called the *anthropological*, from the character of the investigations, in contradistinction to the preceding cosmological period, saw the beginnings of the psychological, logical, and ethical problems. To this period belong Socrates and the Sophists, among whom the best known were Protagoras, Hippias, and Prodicus. Socrates, who coincides with the Sophists in the anthropological direction of his investigation, maintained the existence of a universally valid truth in opposition to the Sophists, and endeavoured, through scientific insight, to gain sure principles for the ethical conduct of human life. On Socratic principles new schools were founded, the most notable being: the *Megarian*, established by Euclid; the *Cynic*, by Antisthenes; and the *Cyrenaic*, or Hedonistic, by Aristippus. (Cf. Gomperz, I., trans. Magnus.)

§ 5. The two preceding movements of philosophical investigation, viz. the cosmological and the anthropological, were only by-paths, and prepared the way for the main development of Greek thought, which took place in the *systematic period*, and reached its height in the systems of Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle. The early Greek philosophers, both of the cosmological and the anthropological period, seized upon a limited number of questions, whilst the systematic period embraced both the physical and psychological problems. The great personalities like Democritus, Plato, and especially Aristotle, making use of the entire material of knowledge gained by experience and observation, and, with an all-sided scientific interest, directing their work of investigation to the entire compass of scientific problems, gave the world an all-embracing system of science, complete in itself. "The systematising of knowledge," says Windelband, "so that it should become an all-inclusive philosophical doctrine, was achieved with increasing success by Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle, and with the last, first found the form of an organic articulation of science into the individual disciplines. With this Aristotle concluded the development of Greek philosophy, and inaugurated the age of the special sciences." It was Aristotle who concentrated and crystallized the entire content of Greek thought; he gave the world a complete system of Philosophy and treated all its disciplines, namely, Metaphysics, Logic, and Psychology; Ethics, Politics, and Æsthetics.

§ 6. The second great period of Philosophy is the Hellenistic-Roman. The great speculative systems had come to a close, and a tendency towards scientific details arose. The fundamental character of this period is erudition more than speculation, and also a cultivation of the special sciences. If Philosophy took a new departure, which it followed for several centuries, it was due to the state of general culture and to the turn taken by Greek social and political life.

The Greeks had attained a state of maturity in the development of their natural literature and art, when Alexander the Great bridged the gulf dividing Occident and Orient. Greek culture and civilization, passing

beyond the boundaries of their national domain, crossed this bridge and spread over "the Asiatic world. To perpetuate his name, the great Macedonian king had founded a city, and selected for this purpose, with extraordinary prescience, a spot on the banks of the Nile which, on account of its geographical position, was destined to become an entrepôt between Asia and Europe, and a centre not only of international commerce, but also of intellectual culture.

Greek civilization and philosophy spread all over the world. Along with Athens, other towns in the Alexandrian dominions, and later on in the Roman Empire, became centres of culture and civilization.

Coming under the Roman sway, the Greek world again underwent, not only politically but also intellectually, a complete change. As the Roman conquest had worn away all political differences and national divergences, and by uniting the various races under the rule of the Empire was bringing to its consummation the work begun by the Macedonian conqueror, it could not fail to influence the train of thought. On the one hand the political and ideal structure of Greek life was crumbling and bringing down the support and guiding principle supplied by the duties of citizenship and the devotion to the commonwealth. Man was thrown upon himself to find the principles of conduct. The customary morality and religion had been shaken in their foundations. The belief in the old gods and the old religion was undermined. Philosophy endeavoured to occupy the place left vacant by the gradual decay of the national religion. The individual, seeking for support and spiritual guidance, found it, or at least imagined he had found it, in Philosophy. The task of Philosophy was, therefore, as Windelband says, "*to find a compensation for religious faith.*" The conduct of life became the fundamental problem, and Philosophy assumed a practical aspect. It aimed at finding a complete art of living. It had a thoroughly ethical stamp, and became more and more a rival of and opposed to Religion. Such were the tendencies of the Stoic and Epicurean Schools. The Roman rule was greatly favourable to such a phase of

thought. The Romans were a practical nation ; they had no conception of nor appreciation for purely theoretical problems, and demanded practical lessons and philosophical investigations which should serve as a guide for life. Thus the political tendency of the time towards practical wisdom had imparted a new direction to philosophical thought. Yet as time went on a deep feeling of dissatisfaction seized the ancient world in the midst of all the glories of the Roman rule. This huge Empire could offer to the peoples, which it had welded into one mighty unit, no compensation for the loss of their national independence—it offered them no inner worth nor outer fortune. There was a complete discord running through the entire civilization of the Græco-Roman world. The social condition of the Empire had brought with it extreme contrasts in the daily life. The contrasts had become more pronounced. Abundance and luxury existed side by side with misery and starvation. Millions were excluded from the very necessities of existence. With the sense of injustice and revolt against the existing inequality of the state of society, the hope for some future compensation arose. The millions, excluded from the worldly possessions, turned longingly to a better world. The thoughts of man were turned to something beyond terrestrial life, to heaven instead of earth. Philosophy too had failed to give complete satisfaction. Man had realised his utter inability to find knowledge in himself by his unaided efforts. He despaired to arrive at it without the help of some transcendental power and its kind assistance. Salvation was not to be found in man's own nature, but in a world beyond that of the senses. Philosophy could not satisfy the cultured man by the presentation of its ethical ideal of life, could not secure for him the promised happiness. Philosophy therefore turned to Religion for help.

Yet so strongly was the ancient world "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought," so deeply had it become permeated by the feeling of a need for knowledge, that Religion desired to satisfy not only feeling but also the intellect, and was anxious to transform life into a doctrine. Therefore while Philosophy sought the solution of the

problems, at which it had been labouring in vain, in religious and transcendental help, Religion sought Philosophy and its method, desiring a scientific basis for its religious longing or conviction, so as to make itself more acceptable to a cultured age. "Philosophy employed the conceptions of Greek science to clarify and put in order religious ideas, to give to the importunate demand of religious feeling an idea of the world that should be satisfactory to it, and so created the systems of *religious metaphysics* in more or less intimate connection with the contending religions." (Windelband, p. 158.)

Thus the fusion of religious and philosophical ideas which characterizes the state of intellectual evolution immediately preceding and following the formation of Christianity, is to be found in the general state of mind of society under Roman sway and in the civilization of the time. The moral disintegration made the need of reaction felt.

On account of the revolution in social and political institutions, the mixture of nations of various origins and of the changes which took place in religion and custom, a new spirit came over Philosophy, and it consequently took a new turn. In a measure, as Greek thought and civilization stepped out from their national restrictions and passed beyond the boundaries of their original Hellenism, they became more and more cosmopolitan in their tendencies. Greek Philosophy, on the one hand, endeavoured to satisfy man, not as a member of a certain social group or political commonwealth, but as an individual, be he Greek, Oriental, Roman, Pagan, or Jew. On the other hand, Philosophy also endeavoured to take the place vacated by the national religion, which had lost its hold upon the cultured world.

The result of this general state of affairs was that the point of view of the Hellenistic Roman wisdom for the conduct of life was that of *individual morality*, and the Philosophy which busied itself with this had either an *ethical* or religious stamp. The general political and cosmological questions are relegated to the background, and the anthropological problems gain precedence.¹ Such were the tendencies expressed in the doctrines of Stoicism,

¹ Cf. W. Wundt, "Einleitung in die Philosophie," p. 124.

HISTORICAL SKETCH

Epicureanism, and Scepticism; Neo-Platonism, Judaëo-Hellenic Philosophy and Gnosticism.

The geographical centre of this movement of fusion and reconciliation was, however, in Alexandria. After having been the city of the museum and the library, of criticism and literary erudition, Alexandria became once again the meeting-place of philosophical schools and religious sects; communication had become easier, and various fundamentally different individuals belonging to distinct social groups met on the banks of the Nile. Not only goods and products of the soil were exchanged, but ideas and thoughts. The mental horizon was widened; comparisons ensued, and new ideas were suggested and formed. This mixture of ideas necessarily created a complex spirit where two currents of thought—of critical scepticism and superstitious credulity—mixed and mingled. Another powerful factor which arose in Alexandria was the close contact in which Occidentalism, or Greek culture, found itself with Orientalism. Here the Greek and Oriental spirits met and mingled, producing doctrines and religious systems containing germs of tradition and science, of inspiration and reflection. Images and formulas, method and ecstasy were interwoven and intertwined. The brilliant qualities of the Greek, his sagacity and subtlety of intelligence, his lucidity and facility of expression, were animated and vivified by the Oriental spark, and gained new life and vigour. On the other hand, the contemplative spirit of the Orient, which is characterized by its aspiration towards the invisible and mysterious, would never have produced a coherent system or theory had it not been aided by Greek science. It was the latter that arranged and explained Oriental tradition, loosened its tongue, and produced those religious doctrines and philosophical systems which culminated in Gnosticism, Neo-Platonism, the Judaism of Philo, and the Polytheism of Julian the Apostate. It was the contemplative Orient, with its tendency towards the supernatural and miraculous, with its mysticism and religion, and Greece, with her subtle scrutinizing and investigating spirit—in other words, logical analysis and feeling, fused into one—which gave rise to the peculiar phase of thought prevalent in

Alexandria during the first centuries of our era. It was tintured with idealistic, mystic, and yet speculative and scientific colours. Hence the religious spirit in Philosophy and the philosophic tendency in the religious system that are the characteristic features. "East and West met and commingled at Alexandria. The co-operative ideas of civilizations, cultures, and religions of Rome, Greece, Palestine, and the Further East found themselves in juxtaposition. Hence arose a new problem, developed partly by Occidental thought, partly by Oriental aspiration. Religion and Philosophy became inextricably mixed, and the resultant doctrines consequently belong to neither sphere proper, but are rather witnesses of an attempt at combining both. These efforts naturally came from two sides. On the one hand, the Jews tried to accommodate their faith to the results of Western culture, in which Greek culture predominated. On the other hand, thinkers whose main impulse came from Greek Philosophy attempted to accommodate their doctrines to the distinctively religious problems which the Eastern nations had brought with them. From whichever side the consequences be viewed, they are to be characterized as theosophical rather than purely philosophical, purely religious, or purely theological." (Baldwin, "Dictionary of Philosophy," Art., Alexandrian School.)

§ 7. The third period of Philosophy is that of the Middle Ages, or, strictly speaking, the Christian Philosophy.

The Roman Empire fell a prey to the Northern barbarians, who devastated the ancient Greco-Roman civilization. The deluge of barbarian invasion—Goths, Burgundians, Vandals, Suevi, Alani, Celts, and Saxons, and especially the Mongolian hordes, the Huns—broke from all parts upon the vast, aged Roman Empire, too weak and exhausted, in consequence of moral disintegration and social decay, to offer resistance to the vigorous primitive peoples.

Those barbarians no doubt brought with them race characteristics, ideas, and institutions, which, though those of a primitive people, were noble and well developed, and able to enter later on into competition with those of

a higher civilization on something like equal terms.¹ They were, however, still in a rude and primitive state, and centuries passed before they took up the classical inheritance, and, welding it with their own thoughts and ideas into one, developed the modern civilization. They had as yet no comprehension for Greek Art or for the fine structures of Hellenic Philosophy. An age of ignorance and rudeness replaced the days of culture and of civilization; of literary erudition and brilliancy in the departments of art and science which characterized the intellectual centres of the Greco-Roman world. "Væ diebus nostris," exclaims Gregory of Tours, describing the barbarism of his age, "quia periit studium litterarum a nobis."² Undoubtedly all the great conquests of the Hellenic spirit would have been completely crushed and hopelessly lost to posterity, had not a few Christian scholars—practically against the general attitude of the Church—saved the *débris* of an ancient civilization, and preserved them for better days, when the destroyers, having arrived at an age of maturity and intellectual development, gratefully made use of them.

The Church, however, as a whole was against the cultivation of Greek and Roman literature; it was opposed to the spread of the intellectual life and civilization of antiquity. It was obliged to define the limits within which thought could move; for since it possessed the truth by an infallible revelation it could not consistently allow the search for truth. The Church as a whole was therefore practically hostile to Philosophy and Science. Worlds of intellectual life were thus lost, or at least could only be discovered afterwards with great difficulty when the first rays of the Renaissance tinted with Orient colours the sombre sky of the Middle Ages.

If, therefore, in the monasteries there existed a respect for learning which caused the monks to save something of the philosophy of antiquity, it was strictly limited to that portion of the intellectual content of ancient civilization which had been taken up into the doctrine of the

¹ Cf. G. B. Adams, "Civilization during the Middle Ages," p. 88.

² Cf. Hauréau, "Histoire de la Philosophie Scholastique," p. 3. Cf. too, Prof. Taylor, "The Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages."

Christian Church. All things else, especially the doctrines opposing Christian teaching, were rigidly excluded. Occidental Philosophy thus became the handmaid of Religion for centuries. Her chief aim and object were the justification and definition of the Christian doctrines. Philosophy became a systematizer and rationalizer of the religious dogma. To show how the doctrinal content, whose truth was taken for granted on authority, was also acceptable to reason, and capable of being justified to it, became the task of Philosophy.

The entire course of the evolution of the Christian Philosophy is generally divided into two great periods. The first begins with the opening centuries of the Christian era, when the Fathers of the Church, many of whom had been philosophers before they became theologians, found it necessary to justify themselves and their doctrines to the heathen world. This period practically ends with the last great Father of the Church, Augustine (354-430), but is continued by some Church writers of a secondary standing until the ninth century, and is known as the Patristic period. The second period, which extends from the ninth to the fifteenth century, is termed the Scholastic period, so called because the whole work was done in the schools of the monasteries by the monks. The word Scholasticism is derived from the Latin *scholasticus* (master of a school). Charlemagne had founded schools all over France, and the teachers were termed *doctores scholastici*. They were ecclesiastics, and philosophized wholly in the interests of the Church. Thus Scholasticism comprises that period of mediæval thought in which Philosophy was pursued under the domination of Theology, having for its aim the exposition of Christian dogma in its relations to reason. Scholasticism began in the eighth century and ceased with the Renaissance (fifteenth century).

"Scholasticism," says Hegel, in his "Lectures on the History of Philosophy,"¹ "is not a fixed doctrine, like Platonism or Scepticism, but a very indefinite name which comprehends the philosophic endeavours of Christendom for the greater part of a thousand years." "The Scholastic Philosophy is really Theology, and this Theology is

¹ Vol. III., p. 38.

nothing but Philosophy. The name of Scholastics attached itself to those alone who propounded Theology scientifically and in a system."¹ Scholasticism is thus the Philosophy of Europe developing within the Church in the form of theology. Philosophy and Theology have here been counted as one, and it is their separation that constitutes the transition into modern times, seeing that men have held that for thinking reason something could be true which is not true for Theology. Down to the Middle Ages, on the contrary, it was held as fundamental that there should be but *one* truth. Thus the Theology of the Scholastics is not to be represented as though, as with us, it merely contained doctrines about God, etc., in historic guise, for, in fact, it also has within it the profoundest speculations of Aristotle and the Neo-Platonists.² This is the ruling thought of Scholasticism. It forms an alliance between Philosophy and Theology, and reconciles the spheres of reason and faith, grace and nature, hitherto considered as antagonistic. The founder of Scholasticism is Scotus Erigena, and its most distinguished representatives are St. Anselmus, Abelard, St. Thomas, and Duns Scotus. There are two periods in the history of Scholasticism, the Platonic and the Aristotelian or Peripatetic. Scholastic Philosophy was at first influenced by Platonism; from the thirteenth century, however, it gradually suffered the influence of the doctrines of Aristotle. Whilst, however, the speculation of the Church Fathers is the outcome of classical antiquity only, Scholasticism springs from the soil of the Germanic and Neo-Latin world, and is the product of a new civilization.³

§ 8. The fourth great period is that of Modern Philosophy. It begins with the Renaissance and is continued up to the present time.

The development of Modern Philosophy was brought about by two great historical movements: by the Renaissance, or Revival of Learning and of Classical Antiquity in Art and Science, and by the Reformation. Towards the middle of the fifteenth century the civilization of

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 39. ² *Ibid.*, p. 40. ³ Cf. A. Weber, "History of Philosophy," p. 202.

Greece effects its entrance into the mental horizon of the Occidental world. Forth from Italy come the Greek language, the poetry and philosophy of the ancient Hellenic world, and begin their triumphant march over Europe. The influences causing these great movements had been at work for some time past, but the Renaissance became an accomplished fact during the second half of the fifteenth century, when the Eastern Empire, with its capital, Constantinople, was conquered by the Turks, and Greek scholars, leaving their country, sought refuge in Italy. The influences bringing about the Renaissance had been at work as early as the Crusades, if not earlier. For the Renaissance was not a *creatio ex nihilo*. The spirit of antiquity was not dead or plunged in a lethargic sleep from which it was awakened, like an enchanted princess, by the kiss of the Italian poets. The three streams of culture and civilization—the Greek, the Semitic, and the Roman—once met and mingled in Alexandria, producing new and peculiar currents of thought. The united stream divided again, and went forth in three parts to fertilize the world. The three currents of mediæval thought—the Greco-Christian, the Roman-Christian, and the Arabian, with its bye-stream of Jewish thought—flowed calmly and silently for several centuries without meeting or crossing. They had their respective intellectual centres in Constantinople, Paris, Baghdad, and the Spanish Universities. They met at the Court of Frederick II., where a new pagan culture, the outcome of the amalgamation of the three civilizations, arose. The spirit of revolt and independence began to move its wings. It was too early, however; the Church was still too dominant, and the mind of man still too much under the rule of faith. The tide was turned again into other ecclesiastical channels, or Scholastic Philosophy. With the year 1453 the Renaissance became an accomplished fact. The slow but gradual evolution of thought reached its culminating point in that period. The threefold stream of civilization that came forth from the garden-land of Egypt, again met in the Medicean Gardens at Florence. It had left the city on the banks of the Nile centuries before to traverse Europe in three parallel, distinct currents, and now discharged its roaring

waves in the Arno town, the centre of the Renaissance. The streaming spirits of Oriental, Byzantine, and Latin-Christian civilizations met there, overflowed the banks and poured forth all over Europe.¹

"The conditions which had prevailed in the earlier Middle Ages, and obscured the learning which the ancients had acquired, were changing rapidly, the effects of Teutonic invasion were passing away. . . . The stir of great events, and the contagion of new ideas in commerce and exploration and politics filled the air, and the horizon of men's minds and interests was daily growing wider." (G. B. Adams, "Civilization during the Middle Ages," p. 365.) Man began to realize that behind him lay a most significant history which could teach him many things. Weary of mediæval tradition, with its dry Scholasticism—tired of the ecclesiastical shackles which prevented man from thinking for himself—the human mind turned to Grecian thought and to Hellenic culture. It was the Oriental in Alexandria over again; the mediæval scholar was delighted when the world of Hellenic thought, with all its wealth and in all its splendour, was revealed to him. A period more pagan than Christian—in fact, opposed to the religious civilization of the Middle Ages—sprang up. All philosophical systems of antiquity were revived. Platonism, which since its overthrow in Alexandria had for many centuries been hidden from the light of men in Eastern monasteries, now emerged into existence in the favouring atmosphere of Italy. The Academy of Athens was revived in the Medicean Gardens of Florence, and philosophers looked back with delight and devotion to the illustrious pagan times. (Cf. Draper, "The Intellectual Development," Vol. II., ch. 6.)

§ 9. Side by side with the enthusiasm for classical civilization in Art and Science and the Revival of Learning, stood the Reformation. The new stream of culture which flowed from Byzantium by the way of Italy inundated Europe and diverted the course of Western thought. It was, however, not only a revival of Learning and recovery of what the ancient world had known, but a "re-birth of

1 Cf. L. Stein, "An der Wende des Jahrhunderts," pp. 66, 70, 76.

emotions and of faculties long dormant, an awakening of man to a new consciousness of life and of the world in which he lives, and of the problems which life and the world present for the thinking mind to solve, and to a consciousness also of the power of the mind to deal with these problems and to investigate the secrets of nature." (Adams, *o.c.*, p. 365.)

Burckhardt, in his admirable work "The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy" (p. 131), expresses himself to the following effect: "In the Middle Ages both sides of human consciousness—that which was turned within as that which was turned without—lay dreaming or half awake beneath a common veil. The veil was woven of faith, illusion, and childish prepossession, through which the world of history were seen clad in strange lines. Man was conscious of himself only as a member of a race, people, party, family, or corporation—only through some general category." This veil dissolved in the time of the Renaissance into air, "an objective treatment and consideration of the State and of all the things of the world became possible. The subjective side at the same time asserted itself with corresponding emphasis; man became a spiritual individual and recognized himself as such." Unbridled individualism and an opposition to authority as well as a high degree of cosmopolitanism—which is a mark of the most cultured periods in the history of intellectual development—are the characteristic features of that age. Whilst opposing the mediæval type of thought and culture, the Renaissance period accentuated the worth and meaning of human nature and mundane life. The scholars therefore, those who in that age devoted themselves to the study of classical literature and the culture of antiquity, are called Humanists, and their ideals and doctrines are known as Humanism. *The growth and development of individualism, the doctrine that man should think for himself, a mental function which had been neglected during the age of mental slavery, was one of the brightest victories gained by the Humanists. It had been striven after by the Italian mind for some time past.*

The first rays of that recognition appeared on the sky of the Renaissance, and came forth in all its splendour in the

time of the Encyclopædists; the thoughts of the Renaissance again found expression in the words of Diderot and Pousseau, of Winckelmann, Hamann, and Herder.¹

Philosophy in the Renaissance," says Windelband (p. 59), "loses its corporate character, and becomes in its best achievements the free deed of individuals." This tendency and striving for individual freedom, the development of individuality, which was one of the highest achievements of the Renaissance, was further aided by the Reformation.

The right of individual judgment, the emancipation of thought from the restrictions put upon intellectual activity by ecclesiasticism—ideas which had lain dormant in the spirit of the age, and were the cause rather than the result of the movement (cf. Wundt, p. 176)—emerged into prominence in the Reformation. Revolt against the authority of the Church and appeal to individual judgment are the principles of the Reformation. It became a liberating force, not only by freeing the spirit of the time from ecclesiastical bondage, but by wresting Philosophy from the grip of theology, and by establishing it as a separate, independent *secular knowledge*. These two movements, viz. the Revival of Learning and the Reformation, allied together, were instrumental in bringing into prominence a third factor, which coloured the beginning of modern thought, and formed the real transition from mediæval to modern Philosophy. I refer to the *natural sciences*. Under the guidance of natural science, modern Philosophy made her first independent attempts; and whilst the new and great discoveries, the widening of the geographical horizon, the voyages of Columbus, Vasco de Gama, and Magellan, the new world-system of Copernicus, the scientific investigations of Stevinus, Tycho de Brahe, Galileo, Kepler, Gilbert and others, accompany the development of modern Philosophy, it followed that natural science—differing so widely from the conceptions of the ancient world—influenced the course of modern thought.

"The more Philosophy established itself by the side of Theology as an independent secular science, the more its

¹ Cf. H. S. Chamberlain, "Die Grundlagen des 19ten Jahrhunderts," p. 896.

peculiar task was held to be the *knowledge of nature*. In this result all lines of the philosophy of the Renaissance met. Philosophy shall be natural science—this is the watchword of the time.” (Windelband, p. 354.)

§ 10. Thus the Renaissance and the Reformation brought about the dawn of modern Philosophy, which, differing widely from the current of thought of the Middle Ages, offers a striking analogy with the intellectual history of antiquity, and pursues almost the same course. Modern philosophy, from the time of the Renaissance downwards, shows the same mode of development. It forms a transition from faith to reason.

The spirit of reflection, awakening from its long inactivity, first begins to subject the whole religion, and the institutions founded upon it, to a searching and destructive criticism. The characteristic feature of a period of transition is the conflict between various ideas and conceptions, the old and the new. Dissatisfaction with and disillusion of the past and a desire for a new and better state ensue. Whilst, however, the past is crumbling, the future is not yet crystallized, and is still in a state of becoming. Hence the fluctuating state of mind, the eagerness for new ideals and ideas and new conceptions of the world, coupled with a searching in the past for corroboration. Reason, in a moment of sublime self-assertion and a superabundance of revolutionary strength, emancipates itself from the shackles of faith, awakes from the deadly torpor into which it has been lulled by the mysterious whisperings of religious belief, and begins a new phase of life; yet it still clings to the past. Old ideas are adapted to the new system, and old designs are made use of for the new structure.¹

That is exactly what happened at the dawn of modern Philosophy. Mediæval thought had a distinctly religious aspect. The objects of knowledge and the spirit in which the investigations were carried on were prescribed by faith. The intellectual development was nothing but a long, continuous prayer. The philosophic investigations centred round transcendental subjects and the life hereafter. But

¹ Cf. Th. Ziegler, “Die geistigen u. sozialen Strömungen des 19ten Jahrhunderts,” p. 523.

in consequence of causes mentioned above, there dawned the age of rebellion and revolution. A bitter struggle against the existing system, a tumultuous tussle with existing principles ensued, dissatisfaction undermined the existent but old and outgrown doctrines, "war is declared against authority of every sort, and freedom of thought is inscribed on the banner."¹ "Modern Philosophy is Protestantism in the sphere of the thinking spirit. Not that which has been considered true for centuries; not that which *another* says, though he be Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas, is true; but that only which is demonstrated to *my own* understanding with convincing force." Freedom and independence of thought, the shaking off of the chains of ecclesiastical bondage, characterize the age. The old and outgrown doctrines of dry Scholasticism are accordingly undermined, mediæval thought is discarded, disputes concerning transcendental subjects are done away with, but still the new idea is not yet found, or at least is in a state of becoming. Philosophy therefore in its state of transition looked back to the past—not to the immediate epoch with which it was about to break, but to a distant childhood, to the reminiscences of antiquity. There it found a preliminary substitute. "Thus Philosophy, also, joins in that great stream of culture, the Renaissance and Humanism, which, starting from Italy, poured forth over the whole civilized world." (Falckenberg, p. 11.) I have said above that modern Philosophy, beginning with the Renaissance, is naturalistic in its tendencies. Under the impulse of the Hellenic spirit, the modern intellectual activity was concentrated, as once in Hellas, upon a disinterested conception of nature and natural science. The desire for a new knowledge of the world found its stimulus in the acquaintance with the ancient Greek thought. It is true, as has been observed, that "in Philosophy, as well as in Art and Literature, the way to nature leads through Greece." The modern Philosophy was, however, not only naturalistic but also individualistic in its tendencies. One of its characteristics was the appeal to individual reason and the emancipation from the bondage of faith. The modern movement to

¹ Cf. Falckenberg, "History of Modern Philosophy," p. 10.

assert the right of individual judgment and the privilege of man to investigate and criticize everything, irrespective of external authority. In short, individual reason is set up as the final court of appeal. Placing absolute confidence in the power of reason, it was held capable of solving all the riddles of the universe, and of discovering its ultimate secrets. This is the current of thought upon which the great metaphysical systems of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz float along. It is Rationalism.

§ 11. Gradually, however, this very tendency of submitting everything to the test of reason, led to the calling of reason itself in question. Not only the material world but the mind itself is subject to observation and intelligent examination. Again, as in Greece, so in modern times, the cosmological period of natural science was followed by one of an anthropological character. The investigations were transferred to the origin of human knowledge, and the current of thought turned into a psychological channel. What is the origin and source of knowledge and cognition? Is it reason or experience? Such is the inquiry instituted by John Locke, who took up the lines of Descartes. Like his predecessor, Bacon, Locke finds the source of knowledge not in reason but in experience. Whilst, however, Empiricism, or the theory that knowledge is derived from experience, is prevalent in Britain, Rationalism, or the doctrine that reason is the source of cognition, remains in power on the Continent. Comparing the mental characteristics of the three great nations which participated in the works of Philosophy during the period between Descartes and Kant, Falckenberg (*l.c.*, p. 81) expresses himself as follows: "The Frenchman tends chiefly to acuteness, the Englishman to clearness and simplicity, the German to profundity and thought. France is the land of mathematical, England of practical, Germany of speculative thinkers; the first is the home of the sceptics, though of the enthusiasts as well; the second of the realists; the third of the idealists."

Locke's Empiricism was developed by David Hume, one of the most consistent and deepest representatives of English thought, to Positivism and Scepticism. Again,

this phase of thought finds an analogy in the intellectual life of Greece. Whilst Hume's Scepticism roused in the "Scottish School," a reaction of common sense, it "helped to wake in Germany a kindred but greater spirit from the bonds of dogmatic slumbers, and to fortify him for his critical achievements." This refers to Immanuel Kant.

We have seen that modern Philosophy evolved on the same lines as thought in ancient Greece. Greek Philosophy in its infancy was naturalistic. Its object was the world of nature. Then it turned its gaze to man and his inward life. First cosmological, Philosophy afterwards became anthropological, and through the movement of Sophistry it gradually led up to Scepticism. The stream of modern thought followed exactly the same current. It was characterized by its naturalism when it left its source in the Renaissance, it became anthropological as it traversed Holland, Germany, and France, and developed into a *theory of knowledge* on reaching England, where it finally fell into Scepticism. And just as the Scepticism of the Sophists had prepared the way for the Socratic reform and the Idealistic system of Plato, so Hume's scepticism paved the way for the Kantian reform, which developed into later German Idealism. Hume had shaken Locke's Empiricism to its foundations.

To escape the influence of Hume, who "had struck a spark at which a flame might have been kindled had it fallen on material susceptible of ignition, and had its burning been carefully maintained, and fanned to greater intensity," Kant "roused himself from his dogmatical slumber." Rationalism and Empiricism had thus continued their course on parallel lines, and were still waging war, making claims and falling into self-contradiction, when Kant attempted a reconciliation. He was a destroyer in the realm of thought, yet he was not "a spirit that denies." He tried to vindicate the contradictions by relegating reason and experience within their boundaries, and by estimating them according to their participation in knowledge of reality. The Rationalist and the Empiricist had discussed the origin of knowledge without raising the question of the possibility of knowledge,

had placed a naïve and full confidence in the human mind as capable of cognizing things; Kant now directed his investigations to knowledge itself. He raised the question of a possibility of knowledge, and subjected human intelligence itself to a searching investigation. In contradistinction to the previous assertion which Kant terms dogmatic (if it denies the validity of knowledge it is sceptic), the sage of Königsberg called his system *criticism*. Kant inquired into the origin and extent of knowledge, into its sources and limits, into the grounds of its existence and its legitimacy. (Cf. Wundt, *l.c.*, p. 246, and Falckenberg, *l.c.*, p. 221.) But only after having investigated the sources of knowledge and established its conditions, can one attempt to determine its sphere and scope. Such is the turn which Kant gave to modern Philosophy, and it has since continued in the same direction up to the present time. The German Idealism of Fichte, of Schelling and Hegel has its roots in Kant's *doctrine of reason*. Recent advances in natural science have, however, added to the legacy of Kant and German Idealism the wealth of new problems. German Idealism concerned itself almost exclusively with the spiritual facts of experience till attention, especially in England, was again turned to the study of the history of humanity, to external nature and to the natural sciences. The most important theory of this new scientific epoch is the theory of Evolution, which now is claiming almost general attention.

PART II

THE PROBLEMS AND SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER X

INTRODUCTORY

§ 1. THE questions with which philosophical inquiry occupies itself and the problems it endeavours to solve are many. They embrace everything that is of a purely scientific or of a practical interest to man. We can, however, briefly classify them as replies to the three great questions: *What? How? and Why?*

What exists? and how does it exist? are riddles to which Metaphysics tries to find a solution. What do we know of the existence of things? and how do we know it? are questions with which the Philosophy of Knowledge concerns itself. What are we to do? and why do we act in this way and not in another? are questions belonging to the domain of Ethics. The answers shaped out to these replies gave rise to the various philosophical schools and systems. Every man, every philosopher, has replied according to his opinion or his character, and, we might add, his surroundings, education, and the spirit of his time. Fichte quite truly remarked that the kind of Philosophy a man chooses depends on the kind of man he is. It also depends, it must be added, on the spirit of the time.

Philosophers had no time to approach all questions: life is so short, and the human mind, even the most brilliant, even the most universal, is limited and finite. Hence that variety of systems in the history of Philosophy.

Not only do the methods and replies to one and the same question vary, but even the subject-matter to which philosophers devoted their powers of subtle analysis is not always the same. I therefore divide all the philosophical problems into three groups :

1. The metaphysical or ontological,
2. The ethical, and
3. The epistemological problems.

CHAPTER XI

THE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEMS

§ 1. **ON** a pyramid in the Temple of Isis at Sais an old inscription contained the following words: "I am everything that was, that is, and that will be, and no mortal has ever lifted the veil that covers my immortality." Modern science maintains that it has pierced the veil, and that "force" and "matter" are everything that was and will be. Whether it is true or not, this is not the place to discuss. What we merely wish to state is that, successfully or not, the human mind has done its best to lift the veil and tried to penetrate the hidden secret so jealously guarded. "*Der Mensch ist nicht geboren die Probleme der Welt zu lösen, wohl aber zu suchen, wo das Problem angeht und sich sodann in der Grenze des Begreiflichen zu halten,*" says Goethe.

The human mind has read the riddle of the universe in various ways and explained it accordingly. Among the questions to which man has always endeavoured to evolve an answer, viz. What is? What do I know? and What am I to do? the first one, the metaphysical What is?—What exists?—has principally excited human curiosity. The replies given by philosophers at various ages have differed greatly, and have given rise to many metaphysical schools.

If we ask an ordinary, practical man to tell us what exists, he would reply, without hesitation: "Why, everything that surrounds me, that vast multitude of things that I see and hear and grasp and touch, the skies and the earth, the trees and the rivers, the sun and the stars, the birds in the air, the fish in the water, and the animals

in the wood—in a word, all that I see and grasp and touch.” Yet among these many things there is a difference; there are some that move, walk, creep, or fly, whilst others are motionless—the first live, whilst the others are lifeless. The living things themselves, when touched by the hand of death, cease to show these signs of movement and become motionless.

“These limbs, whence had we them? this stormy force, this life-blood with its burning passion? They are dust and shadow.” “A little while ago, they were not; a little while, and they are not, these very ashes are not.”

But what is it, we ask, that produces that change?

My brother,
Awake!—why liest thou so on the green earth?
'Tis not the hour of slumber:—why so pale?
What, hast thou!—thou wert full of life this morn.

But he cannot be dead!—Is silence death?

Such were the words which Byron puts in the mouth of Cain when he sees Abel dying, and finds himself for the first time in the presence of death, and such words have been repeated many and many a time. The human mind came to the conclusion that something invisible, something that we comprehend but cannot see, something immaterial had its abode in all living things. This “being” is a spirit, in a word the “soul.” It is this spirit that gave life and movement to living things, and when that was gone they remained motionless and lifeless. This belief in a soul has found acceptance among all peoples, and philology has proved that there is no language where the word is not found. Thus already from the very beginning man, even without philosophizing, distinguished between matter and spirit. Matter perishes, spirit is immortal.

Thou canst not *all* die—
There is what must survive.

BYRON.

The philosopher, however, not satisfied with such vague notions, tried to find the fundamental principle which lies

behind all existence, and from which all things proceed. "There is nothing but spirit," said the one, "all matter is phenomenal." This theory is called Spiritualism (or sometimes misnamed Idealism). "No, there is only matter," said the other, "all life and motion are nothing but a function or a quality inherent in matter, ceasing entirely with the disintegration of the matter to which it is attached." This theory is called Materialism. Others again maintained that there were two principles—matter and spirit—and that these were united. This doctrine is styled *dualism*, from the Latin *duo*, two. In contradistinction to the theory of Dualism is the theory that maintains there is only one principle; this is called *Monism*, from the Greek *μόνος* (*monos*), alone.

MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM

§ 2. In one of the rooms of the Vatican there exists the famous fresco of Raphael, called "The School of Athens." Aristotle and Plato are the central figures, surrounded by various disciples and followers. Plato points with his finger towards heaven, whilst Aristotle listens coldly, his right hand stretched out towards the earth. This ideal painting represents not only the history of the School of Athens, but that of human thought, and of the philosophical theories of all ages, materialistic and spiritualistic, that have waged war ever since. The spiritualist points to heaven, the materialist points to earth.

Materialism

§ 3. Materialism is the name given to the doctrine which tries to explain the plurality of phenomena by a single principle, which conceives the world as a unity, and maintains that matter is at the basis of everything. It denies the *separate* existence of spirit, which is attached to matter or removed from it, "like horses fastened to or removed from a coach." "The times are past," says Moleschott, "when spirit was assumed to exist independently of matter." (Quoted like Spiritualism, in the philosophical conception which maintains that the ultimate phenomenon is not *one*, but *two* principles—i.e.

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matter and mind, and which is known as the theory or Dualism—Materialism maintains that there is nothing but matter. What we call mind is only one of the forms which ever-changing, ever-varying matter assumes. Matter, however, is not that inert, lifeless mass into which a pure spiritual force brooding over it, apart from it, infuses life. Force is inherent in matter, manifesting itself in its various transformations. Life and thought are its innate qualities, and are the result of a complex combination of molecules of matter. A force, a spirit, a God separate from matter, floating freely above it, giving impulse to it, is an idle conception, according to one of the modern materialists, Moleschott. An absolute spirit as opposed to matter, an absolute creative force distinct from matter, is an absurdity.

All psychical phenomena again are nothing but functions of one of our organs—the brain. Thoughts, volitions, and sentiments depend upon its power and working, its size and constitution. Psychology is the physiology of the brain. Thought is nothing but a motion of matter and vanishes *with* matter. Mental function is a peculiar manifestation of vital power, determined by the peculiar construction of cerebral matter. The same power which digests by means of the stomach thinks by means of the brain. The idea of an individual soul, separate and distinct from the body, independent of the material organ, is a mere verbiage of philosophical psychologists, of no scientific value. In a word, everything is matter or a manifestation of matter. Matter is infinite and immortal, its laws are immutable and eternal. Neither God nor man has created it; it has always existed and will exist for ever, unalterable and imperishable. Nothing is lost—not an atom, not a molecule. It only changes its form, and

Imperious Cæsar, dead and turned to clay,
Might stop a hole to keep the wind away.

SHAKESPEARE.

Professor Carl Vogt went even so far in his definition of thought as to say that the brain produces thought in the same way as the liver produces bile and the kidneys urine.

The soul, life, thought, and conscience are products of

matter; they are latent in every atom of matter,¹ and manifest themselves in a complexity of atoms. The more complicated the material conditions of the organs, the more complex are the effects of their functions. One of the most wonderfully, delicately, and finely constructed organs is the brain, with its function "thought." Matter, however, is not an inert, hard mass, devoid of intrinsic movement, incapable of producing by itself, without the help of another force, the phenomena of life and mind and consciousness. Matter is not always tangible and visible. It consists of uncounted millions of molecules in a gaseous, invisible, inorganized state. By virtue of the harmonious movements of these molecules, matter assumes various forms, giving rise to various phenomena and manifestations like hardness, softness, colour, motion, extension, size, etc., which are only the outcome of the activity of matter. Life and thought belong to the same manifestations. They are not material, however, in themselves; they are, as Buechner says, in his "Last Words on Materialism," not "what matter is, but what matter does." Matter, consisting of small infinitesimal particles (the molecules), is not equally distributed in space, but is grouped in masses—as in nebulae, clouds, suns, planets, and other heavenly bodies. Like matter itself, so the motion of the molecules or that of the composition of molecules is not equal and uniform. Some parts of matter are in a very animated movement, others move only slowly and sluggishly. Matter passed through numerous phases of evolution until it took the shape of our earth, as a condensed, solid, and independent body. Man, too, passed through phases of evolution until the brain, the organ of thought, reached the height of development which results in our modern civilization.

With regard to death Buechner expresses his views as follows:¹ "Great philosophers have called *death* the fundamental cause of all Philosophy. If this be correct, the empirical or experimental philosophy of the present

¹ "Man in the Past, Present, and Future," London, 1872, p. 225. The reader who takes a particular interest in the subject should also consult Buechner's "Das künftige Leben u. die moderne Wissenschaft," Leipzig, 1889.

day has solved the greatest of philosophical enigmas, and shown (both logically and empirically) that there is no death, and that the great mystery of existence consists in perpetual and uninterrupted *change*. Everything is immortal and indestructible—the smallest worm as well as the most enormous of the celestial bodies, the sandgrain or the waterdrop, as well as the highest being in creation: man and his thoughts. Only the forms in which Being manifests itself are changing; but Being itself remains eternally the same and imperishable. When we die we do not lose ourselves, but only our personal consciousness or the casual form which our being, in itself eternal and imperishable, had assumed for a short time; we live on in nature, in our race, in our children, in our descendants, in our deeds, in our thoughts—in short, in the entire material and psychical contribution which, during our short personal existence, we have furnished to the subsistence of mankind and of nature in general.”

Materialism, though monistic, is necessarily atheistic in its tendencies, since it denies the existence of everything but matter. Gods and spirits, devils and phantoms find no room in a space filled with matter. Materialism knows neither Jehovah nor Jupiter; it admits “*ni Dieu, ni diable*.” “Nature suffices itself, there is nothing supernatural.” “Only wrong methods of observation of nature,” says a writer on Materialism, “hallucinations, illusions, and deceit of priests are the sources of the so-called supernatural occurrences.”

§ 4. A detailed description of the various characteristics of materialist doctrines would be out of place in a popular treatise, but a brief historical sketch of their origin and development may be given. “It is,” says Lange, in his “History of Materialism,” “as old as Philosophy, but not older.” It is the first philosophical attempt to conceive the world as a unity, and to rise above the vulgar errors of the senses. Materialism can be traced to the very dawn of philosophical speculation. It is found in the Buddhism of the ancient Indians, in the religious systems of the Chinese, and in that of the most civilized nation of antiquity—the Egyptians. We find it, however, in a

systematic form for the first time in Greece. The ancient Greek philosophers were materialists. They inquired into the original matter from which all things sprang. The materialistic doctrine was, however, clearly developed by the atomists—*i.e.* by Leucippus and his disciple Democritus of Abdera in Thrace (420 B.C.), who may be considered as the head of all materialists. Democritus, one of the most learned Ionian physicians, laid down a theory of atoms. Matter, according to him, consists of infinitely small molecules, which come together and separate, and thus form bodies. The atoms (from the Greek *ἄτομος*, an atom, or indivisible) are endowed with motion. They do not receive it from any other force or principle, but it belongs to their essence. The theories of Democritus were taken up by Epicurus (340), who considered matter as the universal substratum. Soul, mind, thought and consciousness, according to him, are accidents of matter. Among the followers of Epicurus may be reckoned Lucretius Carus (99 B.C.), the famous Roman author, poet and philosopher, who expressed his views in his poem entitled "*De rerum natura*," or "*On the nature of things*." It was this famous poem which, as Lange says, secured for the Epicurean doctrines such an influence on modern thought.

During the Middle Ages the dogma of religion and blind faith, "the charcoal burner's simple and blind creed," gained sway over the spirit of man, and materialism was overwhelmed by Christian Dualism—*i.e.* the doctrine of spirit and matter. Timid voices, like those of the Frenchman Gassendi and the Italian Giordano Bruno, were heard here and there; but they were soon silenced. Giordano Bruno was burnt in the Campofiore at Rome, on February 17th, 1600. In modern times the materialistic doctrine was first revived in England by Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury (1588-1679). According to him all the real phenomena of the world are the outcome of motion. There are no incorporeal spirits for him. By spirit he understands physical bodies in such a refined state as to escape the perception of our senses.

From England Materialism travelled to France, where La Mettrie (1709-1751), in his works "*L'homme machine*" and "*Histoire naturelle de l'âme*," and Baron Holbæ

in his "Système de la nature," gave it a very definite and a reckless expression. During the French Revolution Cabanis (1757-1808) clearly formulated materialistic principles.

In Germany, "where the flood of Idealism (the systems of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel), bursting over it, swept away Materialism," the revival of the natural sciences gave a new impulse to Materialism. Moleschott, "an Epigonus of the Philosophy of Nature," who was guided by the positive spirit of science, became in the last century the propagator and leader of a new, powerful materialistic school. In his work "Kreislauf des Lebens" (Circular Course of Life) he laid down the axiom that "without matter there is no force, and without force no matter." Moleschott was followed by a distinguished naturalist Carl Vogt, who in his work "Vöhlerglaube und Wissenschaft" (Charcoal-burner's Creed and Science) for the first time betrayed materialistic sympathies. Ludwig Büchner, however, inspired by Moleschott, became the ardent and clear interpreter of modern Materialism. His chief work, "Kraft und Stoff" (Force and Matter), has been styled the "Bible of Materialism."

*Spiritualism*¹

§ 5. Opposed to Materialism, or to the doctrine that maintains the material origin of things—of life, thought,

¹ Throughout this book I have used the term "Spiritualism" as denoting the metaphysical doctrine that nothing but "spirit" or "mind" exists. "Spirit," "Spiritualism," "spiritual," or "mental" stand thus in opposition to "Matter," "Materialism," and "material." Although the term Spiritualism is less common in English than its synonym Idealism, I found that it answered my purpose much better. By using the term "Idealism," as opposed to Materialism, one would have to make a distinction not only between the "subjective Idealism" of Fichte, the "objective" of Schelling, the "absolute" of Hegel, and the "transcendental" of Kant, but also between the Idealism in Epistemology, or the Theory of Knowledge, and the identical term denoting a particular theory in Æsthetics. It would only confuse the reader of this book, which is intended for the general public, and would also lead to many definitions and explanations out of place here. I therefore preferred the term "Spiritualism" in the metaphysical sense, and availed myself of "idealism" in "Epistemology" and in "Æsthetics."

feeling, and the various mental phenomena—is the spiritual doctrine known as Spiritualism.

It has often been termed Idealism, and as such opposed to Materialism. This, however, if not entirely wrong, is at least confusing. Idealism is the counter-theory of Realism, and will be treated in that connection in the chapter on the Theory of Knowledge. The consequence of such a wrong definition of terms, is that Materialism is also misunderstood, and considered as a doctrine that teaches egoistic and low tendencies. Materialism has become a term of reproach. It is advisable therefore to be clear as to the distinction between Materialism and Spiritualism. The first of these theories assumes, as the fundamental basis of all things, matter—physical, unconscious, inert matter, which only in its organization and development attains life and feeling, and performs the psychical functions in their grandest manifestations; the second theory, that of Spiritualism, maintains that the real essence of Being, working behind the appearances, is of a spiritual, immaterial nature.¹

Without attempting an exposition of the various systems of Spiritualism, let it be briefly stated that it endeavours to prove that “thought,” although connected with the brain, is by no means the result of it, or, philosophically expressed, their relation is not that of cause and effect. The brain is an instrument necessary for thought, but it does not at all produce thought. Human thought, conscious of its individuality, penetrated with the sense of its personality and its free will, is not the outcome of blind, unconscious matter, even in its most complicated state of organization and composition.

Matter cannot think, cannot feel, or, in other words, that which is thought or felt (is the object) cannot at the same time also think or feel (be the subject). A French poet has summed it up in two lines.

Je pense que la pensée élatante lumière,
Ne peut pas sortir du sein de l'épaisse matière.

¹ Metaphysical Spiritualism must not be confused with modern *Spiritism*—the calling of the dead, table rapping, etc., which belongs to the domain of occultism and mesmerism.

The real essence of things is therefore a special immaterial force, it is Spirit, self-conscious and endowed with the sense of personality. We neither perceive nor comprehend the real essence of things by our sense, but by abstract reasoning, and this essence must therefore also be of an abstract spiritual nature.

§ 6. Spiritualism came into existence after Materialism. The human mind, fond of the mysterious, the unknown, the "je ne sais quoi," that transcends all our powers of verification, could not long be satisfied with Materialism, which robs life of its mysteries. It is for the very same reason that humanity, abandoning belief (the Sphinx shrouded in mystery) for science, ever and anon returns to religion. Materialism and Spiritualism have ever since been and still are, throughout the whole history of human thought, waging war and contending for the supremacy in the realm of Philosophy. Plato had expressed a theory of Spiritualism. He maintained that *ideas* have a real existence, and are the prototypes of all phenomena. In modern times René Descartes revived the Spiritualistic doctrine, but it was Leibniz (1646-1716) who elaborated it. There is one essence of all things, the spiritual. It is one, but divided into an infinity of metaphysical points or *monads*. The monad is created by God, and is finite. The indivisibility of physical points or atoms exist only apparently. They are an agglomeration of metaphysical points, and extension is not a reality but a coexistence of forces.

The real essence of things is an immaterial principle, viz. force. God has created the monads, force centres, endowed with intelligence, unlike each other. The monad is thus a spiritual force or activity, which finds expression in its continual changing states. It is the "living and perpetual mirror" of the universe, and contains an infinity of possible conceptions that struggle from unconsciousness to consciousness. Consciousness is a stream of ideas and feelings that gushes forth from the very essence of every monad. Matter is an aggregate agglomeration of monads. They are, however, naked monads, that are in a state of unconsciousness, and of which dead matter consists.

The term monad is derived from the Greek *μονάς* (*monas*),

unity, which Leibniz seems to have taken from the work of Giordano Bruno, "De Monade." The world is not a machine. Everything therein is force, life, soul, thought, desire. The monads are unextended.

Body is an extension of materiality. But what is the essence of this materiality? It is force, says Leibniz, immaterial, unextended, indivisible, and indestructible. There is a graduation in the perfection of the monads. The most perfect monads rule, the less perfect obey. Dead matter is an aggregate of the less perfect monads without the ruling monad. They are not inanimate, however, for every monad is in itself soul *and* body, soul being its material essence and body its sensible manifestation. If Leibniz admitted a certain reality to matter, Berkeley went much further, and developed a doctrine of extreme Spiritualism. George Berkeley, the Bishop of Cloyne (1685-1753), "a great philanthropist and a small philosopher," as he has been called, unjustly perhaps, by a recent German author, taught that the existence of matter is nothing but an illusion. Only spirit or mind exists. Idea is a thing perceived, and there is no difference between what we call a real thing, or the object we assume to be without us, and our idea, or the image of it. The mind perceives ideas and simultaneously produces the things themselves. Nothing exists without the mind. Leibniz has admitted an objective existence of things, Berkeley denied the existence of unperceived or unperceiving things. The sun, the moon, the trees, etc., would cease to exist if there were no one to perceive them. The mind, however (Berkeley admits a plurality of minds), does not perceive the things, or ideas, by itself alone, or by the power of its *will*, but chiefly through an all-powerful spirit, God, upon which it depends. This Spirit has imprinted upon us ideas the perception of which we usually call "real things."

In his book entitled "Siris" (a chain), where he starts with the medicinal virtues of tar-water and ends with the Absolute, he says that "Ideas are not figments of the mind, but the most real beings, intellectual and unchangeable; and therefore more real than the fleeting, transient objects of sense, which, wanting stability, cannot be subjects of science, much less of intellectual knowledge."

§ In modern times Hermann Lotze, in his "Microcosmus," gave expression to spiritualistic doctrines. Schopenhauer, who accepts as the essence of things the will, and Fechner, in "Nachts und Tages Ansicht," who considers the animation of everything, are spiritualists.

MONISM AND DUALISM.

§ 7. Some philosophers admit *one* principle only as the essence of all things, either spiritual or material; others, on the contrary, maintain that the universe, the world and man are a composition of two distinct principles, spirit and matter, that exist side by side in harmony. Those who accept the first solution (or answer)—*i.e.* the existence of only *one* principle or substratum underlying all phenomena—are called monists, and their system of Philosophy is known under the name of "Monism." "Monistæ dicuntur philosophi," says Chr. Wolf, "qui unum tantummodo substantiæ genus admittunt." "Monists are those philosophers who admit only one kind of substance." They are either Materialists, if they accept matter as that "genus substantiæ," or Spiritualists, if they see in Spirit the sole essence of things.

Eduard v. Hartmann, in his "Philosophie des Unbewussten" (Philosophy of the Unconscious), thinks that the tendency to Monism is to be met with among the original systems, philosophical or religious, of the first rank. Dualism, however, or the system that accepts the coexistence of matter and spirit, is not only that of the naïve or so-called unphilosophical mind, but has also been defended by the great philosophers from the dawn of civilization down to modern times. "Dualistæ sunt," to quote again Wolf's definition, "qui et substantiarum materialium et immaterialium existentiam admittunt." "Dualists are those who admit the existence of material and immaterial substances."

Anaxagoras, Aristotle, the Stoics were dualists. In modern times it was Descartes who worked out the dualistic doctrine which the Occasionalists, with Geulinx,

modified. Herbart, Lotze, and Fichte may be considered as dualists.

Anaxagoras (450 B.C.) assumed the existence of an intelligent principle, the cause of motion, in addition to the inert, unintelligent material substance. The material substance or element is unconscious and incapable of producing motion by itself. It is the spiritual principle, which he calls *νοῦς* (*nous*), sense, intelligence, endowed with consciousness, activity, force, and intelligence, that produces movement and life in the universe.

The two great philosophers of antiquity, Plato and his illustrious disciple Aristotle, are both, strictly speaking, dualists. Plato accepts the coexistence of the ideal and the material principle, or the existence of the worlds of sense and of the Ideas, the archetypes of which the sensible world is only a copy. Aristotle, who admits the two principles, that of matter, which is passive, and form, which is endowed with a power of its own, is also a dualist. His assertion, however, that form or idea and matter do not exist separately, that every being is both form and substratum, idea and matter, body and soul, brings his theories nearer Monism, or at least gives them a monistic tincture. During the Middle Ages Dualism kept its sway, being found in accordance with the doctrines of the Church. The philosophical founder, however, of Dualism in Modern Philosophy is Descartes. He distinguished between the "*res extensa*," the extended, or matter, and the "*res cogitans*" or mind. They are quite different substances, diametrically opposed to each other. The two substances exclude each other.

Mind or spirit is unextended and immaterial, is active and free, whilst body or matter is extended and soulless. Man is a combination of body and soul.

The characteristic attribute of spirit is thought, that of body is extension.

The movements of the body are occasioned by the soul, which is independent of the body, and is indestructible. Body and soul are connected in the pineal gland (Die Zirbeldrüse). Spinoza, starting from the Cartesian doctrine, considered extension and thought as different attributes of one and the same substance, which is the

All, Nature or God. Two different substances, diametrically opposed, can never be united, he thought. He is thus a monist.

In modern times Lotze and Fichte might be accounted dualists.

"Dualism is the creed of all naïve minds, and is the basis of all religions."

And E. Haeckel, in his treatise on "Monism," says as follows: "Most of the older religions and philosophical systems are dualistic, regarding God and the world, creator and creature, spirit and matter, as two completely separated substances. We find this express Dualism also in most of the purer church religions, especially in the three most important forms of Monotheism, which the three most renowned prophets of the eastern Mediterranean—Moses, Christ, and Mohammed—founded."

THE THEOLOGICO-COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM

§ 3. Closely related to the question: What exists? is another problem, a problem that has occupied the minds of men since they began to speculate, and that is: How does it exist? or How did the world come into existence? The human mind, even that of the ordinary man, was early impressed by the strict unity that existed in the seeming variety of nature, in the visible or the invisible world; man soon found out that the phenomena were recurring in strict punctuality, and that there seemed to be established laws, never infringed. During his life, from his earliest childhood to advanced age, everything around him, from the ground he trod upon to the skies above, manifested a marvellous state of law and order. The presence of a system in the uniformity of nature, a regularity amidst the seeming chaos of natural phenomena, forcibly impressed the most superficial observer. The question naturally arose: To what is this order or cosmos due? or How did it come into existence? The first Greek philosophers thought they had done enough by maintaining the existence of a single principle, like water (Thales), the atmosphere (Anaximander), the air or breath (Anaximenes), or fire (Heraclitus). Everything

that existed, they thought, was derived from it, and strove to return to it. Yes; but how did this order of things come out of the chaos? was the question still unanswered, and a precocious child like Epicurus embarrassed his teacher—who informed him that, according to Hesiod, the world originated from chaos—by asking him: And whence did the chaos come? The single or many principles from which everything was supposed to emanate in such a perfect order and regularity must have a cause or a reason. Philosophers therefore, like Democritus and Heraclitus, said that unity is only appearance, and that the infinite number of infinitely small molecules, the atoms, moved in empty space without any design or purpose. They congregate or separate, not as the action of some transcendent principle, but in consequence of necessity, and in accordance with a perpetual motion that is part of their essence. There is no teleology, or design and purpose, in the cosmos. As the number of the atoms moving in infinite space, in the course of infinite time, is infinite in itself, all possible combinations must arise and often repeat themselves. This theory is known under the name of Atomism.

§ 9. Such an explanation, however, could not for long remain satisfactory. Man's innate, indestructible habit of asking for the last cause of every phenomenon on the one hand, and certain vague, but powerful feelings, that of dependence above all and the want of protection, impelled him to believe in the presence of an invisible transcendent power, of a power conscious of its will, which must "bear some remote analogy to human intelligence." This power, the cause of order in the universe, contained the secret of all things, and to it man could look for what he wanted, but did not possess, for protection and happiness. The chaos must have a leader, forming a controlling spirit, that would account for the cosmological order of things, give the key to the solution of the most perplexing riddles, and explain the design and purpose which exist in the universe. "From the perception of the great phenomena of nature," says Max Müller, "the human mind was led to the conception of agents behind these phenomena."

This transcendent power is God. Its existence has been foreshadowed long before the dawn of civilization; almost every race or generation has defined it by a different name: Jehovah, Jupiter, Lord; or the Infinite, the Unknown, the Infinite Will, the Divine, the World-controlling Power, etc.

The heavens proclaim His glory,

or, as Tennyson sings:

The sun, the moon, the stars, the hills, the plains,
Are not these, O soul, the vision of Him that reigns?

This mighty idea of God is deeply rooted in the human breast; at some time or another it wells up, even in the most arid soul. Humble at the beginning, and cradled in selfishness, this idea has developed in the course of time, and afforded ample scope for innumerable diverse theories and conceptions. It evolved from the crude notions of the uncivilized past, from the notions held by the savage, who modelled his fetish, to those of a Hegel, Renan, Max Müller, and others.

This theory, the belief in the existence of an invisible, conscious intelligence, creating and regulating the universe, is called Theism, from the Greek *θεός* = God. It maintains the existence of a personal God or gods, supernatural, transcendent and extra-mundane. It is essential to all creeds and religious beliefs, from the lispings of semi-civilized barbarians to the etherealized religion of a Schleiermacher.

It either admits two or several gods—and is called Polytheism (after the Greek *πολύ*, *poly*, many), which is the basis of many ancient and modern Oriental religions—or it accepts only one God, and as such is known under the name of Monotheism, which is the basis of the three great religions: Judaism, Christianity, or Islam. Unassisted human reason, however, could never attain to such a concept of, or such a belief in God, without a special revelation, which is granted to the human race for that purpose. Thus Theism is necessarily anthropomorphic, from the Greek *μορφή* (*morphē*, form), and *ἄνθρωπος* (*anthropos*, man): it attributes to the Divinity, perfect as it

is, human thoughts and ideas, human qualities and conceptions and passions, and even human form. Distinct from Theism is Deism, which, whilst admitting the existence of a transcendent principle, a Power personal and conscious, denies the necessity of revelation. Deism is also called Rationalism. It defends the existence of God against the Atheist who denies it, but it denies the statement that this God takes an active continuous part in the government of the world, and an interest in human weal and woe. Human reason, unassisted by miracles and revelation, attains to the knowledge of God or the first Cause of bringing order in the chaos. This power requires no special cult, no form of prayer, no mode of worship. The deist dwells on such dizzy heights, in such ethereal regions, that the various creeds and religions lose their characteristic distinctions in the remote distance. Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, monotheistic and polytheistic worship, are mere fleeting waves in the vast ocean of divinity. Buddha, Zoroaster, and Manu are insignificant points on the distant horizon of human ideals. Deism also disputes the "creatio ex nihilo," or the statement that God created the world out of nothing. Deists maintain that God only brought order in the chaotic state of matter, which is eternal. Deists have therefore often been called atheists, and Bossuet termed Deism "a disguised Atheism."

§ 10. Theism and Deism conceive a God who is transcendent, outside or above the world, who governs the world as an establishment apart from Him. Theism goes even so far as to imagine Him sitting on a throne, administering good and evil, rewarding and punishing the human race according to its deserts, taking an interest in human affairs, finding pleasure in sacrifice, and being mollified by prayers, maintaining, however, at the same time, that God is too high for His actions to be understood by man. In contradistinction to these theories of transcendence, or the doctrine that God has reality in Himself apart from His works, Pantheism teaches immanence, or that God is *in* the world, that He is all in all, all that is. It identifies the Deity completely with the inworking force of nature. To give a clear definition of

Pantheism is rather difficult, and Goethe once remarked : " I have never yet met anybody who knew exactly what the word signified." The term was first made use of by Toland in 1705, and is derived from the Greek *πᾶν* (*pan*), everything, and *θεός* (*theos*), God, and thus teaches, as the name indicates, that God is everything, or that everything is God. God and the cosmos, or the world, are not separate, but one and the same substance. There is no personal, extra-mundane God, as anthropomorphic Theism or even Deism maintains. Pantheism deprives God of all His human attributes, disanthropomorphizes Him, denies His personality, and identifies Him with the universe. He is the ever-creative, ever-active force of nature, the cause and design, the spirit whose thoughts are nature and reality. The world is His manifestation, nature His robe. If there were anything besides God, He would no longer be infinite, omnipotent, and omnipresent. According to Pantheism, God is present in every atom of the universe, in every grain of sand in the desert, and in every blade of grass in the field. He is present in the leaf that quivers in the breeze, and in the worm that creeps on the ground.

Yet not the lightest leaf,
That quivers to the passing breeze,
Is less instinct with Thee :
Yet not the meanest worm,
That lurks in graves and fattens on the dead,
Less shares Thy eternal breath.

Pantheism proclaims, to quote another line of the same poet, Shelley—

The omnipresence of that spirit
In which all *live* and *are*.

In his admirable book, " Religion and Philosophy in Germany," Heinrich Heine gives the following definition of Pantheism, " the hidden religion of Germany " : " God is identical with the world. He manifests Himself in the plants, which, without consciousness, lead a cosmic-magnetic life. He manifests Himself in the animals,

which in their sensuous dream-life feel a more or less dumb existence. But most gloriously He manifests Himself in man, who both feels and thinks. In man God reaches self-consciousness, and through man He reveals this self-consciousness; not in and through the individual man, but in and through the whole of mankind. Of *all* mankind it can truly be said that it is an incarnation of God."

§11. To give a complete historical sketch of the theological-cosmological theories would practically mean a history of Philosophy. I shall therefore only mention a few names of those who are connected with the various theories above described, viz. Atomism, Theism, Deism, and Pantheism.

The atomic doctrine was first formulated by Leucippus and his disciple, Democritus. Anaxagoras (of Clazomenæ, in Ionia), however, felt the necessity of some power or organizing spirit which would account for the order of the cosmos. He therefore assumed the existence of an element endowed with force, life, and intelligence, active and free, which is the source of order, life, and movement in the world. This power he called *νοῦς, nous*. His nous, however, is only the spirit that evolves order from chaos; he is the prime mover, but not the creator of matter, which is eternal. In contradistinction to this philosophical view, Theism conceived God as the creator of matter "ex nihilo." This belief is at the basis of all religious creeds. Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, and Kant are all theists. They admit a personal God as the first Cause of the universe. Deism, or Rationalism, conceiving a Supreme Being hovering above things and governing them, not according to its free will, but by means of unchangeable laws, first appeared in England in the eighteenth century, where Toland, M. Tindal, and Shaftesbury were its best-known defenders. With regard to Pantheism, it had been taught in the Rig-Veda, the Indian sacred book, and by the ancient Greek philosophers of Elea, in Lucania, who were known under the name of the Eleates. And even St. Paul teaches Pantheism when he says, "In Him we live, and move, and have our being." Xenophanes taught that there is only one God, who is identical with the universe. Virgil clearly teaches Pantheism in the

Sixth Æneid, when he makes Anchises give the following reply :

Principio cælum, ac terras, camposque liquentes,
 Lucentemque globum Lunæ, Titaniaque astra,
 Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus
 Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet. ♪
 Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitæque volantium,
 Et quæ marmoreo fert monstra sub æquore pontus.
 Igneus est ollis vigor, et cælestis origo
 Seminibus : quantum non noxia corpora tardant,
 Terrenique hebetant artus, moribundaque membra.

ÆNEID, VI. 724-32.

Towards the end of the sixteenth century, Giordano Bruno, braving the threats of the Inquisition, raised his voice against anthropomorphic Theism, and in favour of Pantheism. God, the infinite Being, and the universe are, according to Bruno, but one and the same thing. Those who imagine God as existing *by the side* of other beings make Him finite. He is neither the creator nor the first mover, but the *soul* of the world. It was, however, Benedict Spinoza, of Amsterdam (1632-1677), who elaborated the Pantheistic doctrine, and who is therefore considered the Father of Modern Pantheism. Spinozism and Pantheism have, in fact, become synonymous. Spinoza's doctrine can be briefly summed up as follows : There is one substance in the world, which is God. He is infinite and absolute. All other finite substances proceed from God, and are contained in Him. They have only a fleeting, transient existence. God, or the Infinite, has two attributes by which He reveals Himself to us : extension and thought. Extension modified forms bodies, thought modified forms minds. These attributes are the garments woven for God by the "ever-moving shuttles of the roaring loom of time."

When Spinoza, the lonely sage of Amsterdam, proclaimed his doctrine, the whole "Swiss Guard of Divinity" rose against the enemy, accusing him of Atheism. He was, however, far from atheistic. On the contrary, Spinoza was full of love for the Deity, which he felt throughout nature. From the brimming goblet of nature he had drunk divinity in deep draughts, until, he was

intoxicated with it. There was nothing but divinity for him. In spite of the violent attacks directed against him, Spinoza exercised an immense influence over the greatest minds of Europe. Schiller, Goethe, Lessing, Herder, Schleiermacher, Heine, and Shelley were all Pantheists or Spinozists.

Goethe has expressed his pantheistic creed in "Faust" and in his poem, "Gott und die Welt."

Was war' ein Gott, der nur von aussen stiesse,
Im Kreis das All am Finger laufen liesse?
Ihm ziemt's die Welt im Innern zu bewegen,
Natur in sich, sich in Natur zu hegen,
So das, was immer lebt, und webt, und ist,
Nie seine Kraft, nie seinen Geist vermisst.

PROEMION.¹

Der Allumfasser,
Der Allhalter,
Fasst und erhalt er nicht
Dich, mich, sich selbst?
Und drängt nicht alles
Nach Haupt und Herzen dir,
Und webt in ewigem Geheimniss,
Unsichtbar Sichtbar über dir,
Erfüll davon dein Herz so gross-es ist,
Und wenn du ganz in dem Gefühle selig bist
Nenn das dann wie du willst,
Nenn's Glück! Herz! Liebe! Gott!—FAUST.²

What God would *outwardly* alone control,
And on His finger whirl the mighty whole?
He loves the *inner* world to move, to view
Nature in Him, Himself in Nature too,
So that what in Him works, and is, and lives,
The measure of His strength, His Spirit gives.

² The all-embracing, all-sustaining one,

Say, doth He not embrace, sustain, include
Thee?—me?—Himself?

And does not all that is,
Seen and unseen, mysterious All,
Around thee, and within,
Untiring agency,
Press on thy heart and mind,
Fill thy whole heart with it, and when thou art
Lost in consciousness of happiness,
Then call it what thou wilt,
Happiness—heart—love—God!

CHAPTER XII

THE ETHICAL PROBLEM

§ 1. Among the ethical and moral problems which philosophers of all ages have endeavoured to solve, and to which they have devoted their thoughts, are the following :

- (1) The origin and source of our sense of morality ;
- (2) The inner motives which make us obey the dictates of our moral sense, and thus shape our conduct ;
- (3) The aims, purpose, and ultimate result which we endeavour to attain by our moral actions ;
- (4) The criterion and standard by which our actions are regulated.

§ 2. The first question is that of the origin of the moral feeling : How do we *know* that one particular action is moral and another immoral ? How does the human conscience apprehend and distinguish the good from the bad, the right from the wrong ? And, do we not see that what is considered moral, right, and good by some men, by some generations, or in certain localities, is judged as bad, wrong, and immoral in a different age or locality ? To this question two answers have been given. Certain philosophers maintained that the capacity of distinguishing between right and wrong, good and evil, moral and immoral, is innate in every man. It may differ slightly according to period and environment, but it is fundamentally present in every individual. Everybody is possessed of an immediate knowledge which teaches him to recognize the intrinsic worth of moral ideals. This knowledge is *intuitive*. We feel without being taught that a

certain action is moral and another immoral. This theory is known under the name of Nativism or Intuitionism. Carlyle, when he says, "Truly this same sense of the infinite nature of Duty is the central part of all of us ; a ray as if of Eternity and Immortality immured in dusky, many-coloured Time, and its deaths and births, evidently belongs to the same school. This faculty is independent of environment, time, and education. It is an innate faculty, and can, consequently, not be acquired. It is an *immediate* knowledge that is part and parcel of our nature, given to us to realize moral distinctions in the same way that the eye has been given to us to see, and the ear with which to hear. Butler, who considered conscience the essential element in our nature, and who defines it as the "moral approving and disapproving faculty," belongs to this school of philosophers. Among the Germans Fichte and above all, Kant, belong to this school. Opposed to their view is the school of philosophers who maintain that our knowledge of moral distinctions, like all other knowledge, is derived from experience, and advances with the progress of age and thought. The sense of morality is not innate in man, but is the result of experience, which teaches him to judge certain actions as good or bad, right or wrong. This theory is termed Empiricism, or more frequently Evolutionism. It is based upon the development-theory of Darwin and Wallace, or the biological evolution which regards the complex forms of animate existence and the states of our mental life as having sprung from the simple forms. Thus the Darwinian theory of development has been applied by many philosophers to moral law and the science of morality. Carneri, Mill, Bain, and especially Herbert Spencer are the influential teachers of this school. Just as organism is the product of heredity, the result of selection and rejection of a process extending over many ages, so mind advances from the lowest states to the more advanced. The moral faculty is nothing but the tendency to bring about results judged to be good by experience. The continuity of the experience of the race is tending to modify the conceptions of morals from time to time. According to this school, there is practically no distinct moral faculty. Nothing but the exercise of intelli-

gence is needed to guide us in our actions. It is more the end and motive of morality that it considers than the origin and faculty and moral distinctions. The moral sense is the result of the process of evolution. Morality is only a product, one of the noblest, of evolution, which has been developed and crystallized, and still continues to evolve, together with the race, from the notions of the savage to the ideas of cultured and civilized men.

§ 3. The second question or problem to which moral philosophers directed their attention, and the answers to which have given rise to distinct schools, is that concerning itself with the *end* and *purpose* of human moral actions and conduct. By acting intentionally in a certain way, the human mind, as the agent, has an end or purpose in view, for the sake of which the action is done. As rational beings, endowed with the power of thought, capable of foreseeing the connection existing between our single actions and the results to which they might lead, we are not prompted by mere impulse, but are guided and influenced by the desire to attain the end we have in view. Moral action, therefore, or moral conduct, is the means by which man endeavours to reach a certain end. What is that end to whose attainment moral conduct tends? What is that ultimate good so desirable for man, so eagerly sought for by him? To this question the ancient Greek philosophers, Socrates and Plato, assuming that every man naturally and necessarily seeks his own good, replied that the ultimate good, the "*summum bonum*," is Happiness or Pleasure, *Eudæmonia* or *Hedone*. This theory, known under the name of *Eudæmonism* or *Hedonism*, has been promulgated by the Greek philosophers, and appears in a variety of forms in the history of human speculations on morality. This Happiness, or *Eudæmonistic* theory, which, in opposition to *Intuitionism*, maintains that man becomes moral by rationalizing as to the pleasure or the happiness he wishes to attain, has been expounded in modern times by English philosophers. Paley, Jeremy Bentham, and Mill are the most prominent teachers of this school. Although based upon the Happiness theory, it is now known under the name of *Utilitarianism*. "Every writer," says J. S. Mill, in his

“ Essay on Utilitarianism,” “ from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility, meant by it not something to be contra-distinguished from pleasure, but pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain ; and instead of opposing the useful to the agreeable or the ornamental, have always declared that the useful means these, among other things.” His definition of Utilitarianism is as follows : “ The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain ; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.” Thus this theory, estimating actions according to their true value as nothing but means towards securing happiness, is termed Utilitarianism.

From this view some philosophers differ by declaring that moral actions are not means but ends in themselves. By being moral, we serve the purpose for which we have been destined ; by our moral conduct we are cultivating the powers that have been given to us to acquire knowledge and to know what is True and Right. By our moral conduct we are exercising our moral faculties and developing them ; and thus, by improving our intellectual powers and cultivating our moral sensibility, we are tending towards self-perfection, which is our aim in life. This idea is at the basis of Christian Ethics.

But whose happiness do we aim at ? Some say our own happiness ; others maintain that we desire that of others, or even of the greatest number. Jeremy Bentham summed it up in the sentence : “ The greatest happiness of the greatest number.”

§ 4. Closely related to the question of *end* and *purpose* is the inquiry after the inner motives and springs of human moral conduct. Man is not only endowed with reason and thought, but also with feeling, which influences his mode of thinking, and through this his actions. The rational direction of our moral conduct is easily swayed by our natural disposition—by impulses that are not always rational and often bias our judgments. Feeling, thus

exercising a powerful influence on our voluntary determinations, inclines us to one action rather than another. The internal state or affection of mind influencing the agent is greatly dependent upon the natural disposition, temperament, and environment. Sometimes, also, an impulse is stronger in us, and will sway our reason at certain moments of our life, and lead to actions which at other times we should view differently, and make us either hesitate or hasten to act. Our voluntary determination, our moral conduct, therefore, although a means for the attainment of a certain end, is also dependent upon our natural impulse and upon the motive which induces us to seek for this end or purpose. The end not only harmonizes with, but is to a great extent dependent upon, the motive. We not only *know*, but we also *feel*, that we should act in one way and not in another. It is not only the perception of utility which shapes and directs our actions, but sentiment and feeling.

To discover the general impulse shared by all mankind, the common spring of human conduct, the moral feeling or sentiment which, independently of reason, sways and influences our determinations—and is at the root of our actions—is another of the important problems which moral philosophers have made efforts to solve. The answers to this question given by various philosophers differ. Some, like Hobbes, maintain that man only cares for his *own* happiness, that every man is fighting for his own hand, and that the spring of his actions is to be sought in *egotism*. The rule of his conduct is his own desire. His apparent love of his neighbour is nothing but a disguised egotism. He does a good action out of selfishness, because it affords him pleasure or serves his purpose. Man's ultimate reason for obeying moral laws is his own desire, his selfishness. Every so-called disinterested or benevolent action will, on closer inspection, be found to be the result of a desire for personal benefit, to be obtained immediately or in the future. Some, like Hume and Adam Smith, however, feel that man also possesses feeling for others. There is a feeling of sympathy in the human breast which makes us shape our actions so as to further the happiness of our fellow creatures. Their happiness and misery, and not

a selfish feeling and a consideration for our own pleasure, are at the root of our nature, and constitute the general principle of moral conduct—that is, the source of moral approbation and blame. This theory, in contradistinction to that of egotism, is termed (by A. Comte) Altruism, from the Latin *alter*, another—that is, consideration for the happiness of others rather than our own. Adam Smith and Hume are followers of this theory. There is a something within our nature which we prize more than our individual happiness. This something is the sympathy of the moral agent with the sentiments, pleasures, and happiness of the object of our benevolent actions. This is the ultimate element into which our moral sentiments can be analyzed. Our souls are quivering under a sense of sympathy with our fellow men, of pity for their sufferings, and of anger at wrongdoing, and an intense desire rises in us to promote their welfare and happiness. These feelings constitute a mighty power, springing from the consciousness of our nature and influencing our moral conduct, either in action or restraint from committing certain acts. To the first school, that of Egotism, belonged the ancient philosophers and those of the century of the French Revolution, and in modern times, Max Stirner and Nietzsche. In the school of Altruism we may count Kant, Fichte, and Schopenhauer. Adam Smith and J. S. Mill even demand self-sacrifice of the moral agent. “But this something, what is it, unless the happiness of others?”

“Though it is only in a very imperfect state of the world’s arrangements that any one can best serve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of his own, yet so long as the world is in that imperfect state, I fully acknowledge that the readiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest virtue which can be found in man.” “The Utilitarian morality recognizes in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum-total of happiness, it considers as wasted. The only self-renunciation which it applauds is devotion to the happiness, or to some of the means to happiness, of others, either of mankind collectively, or of

individuals within the limits imposed by the collective interests of mankind."

§ 5. Another problem which has exercised the minds of moral philosophers is that of the moral standard and the sanction of moral conduct. It is the problem of moral principle in relation to man's will, the nature of moral law and obligation as distinct from motive. This problem treats of the basis and binding quality of moral obligation. "I feel," says Mill, in his "Essay on Utilitarianism," "that I am bound not to rob or murder, betray or deceive; but why am I bound to promote the general happiness? If my own happiness lies in something else, why may I not give that the preference?" Questions of duty and the judgment of conduct vary with individuals and their characters. The responsibilities are different in each case. May not our judgment be involved in confusion, and lead us astray? And while thinking we do the right, may we not be doing the wrong? Where do we find the rule and sanction of our moral conduct—the moral law? To this question, again, two answers have been given. Some philosophers find the standard moral law in ourselves. It is a voice within us that tells us how to distinguish truth from falsehood. The moral law is derived from authority within us; it dwells in the inmost recesses of our nature, and helps us to penetrate through the mist of appearances to a clear perception of duty. This moral law serves us as a guide in our actions, and exercises a sovereign authority over every other spring of authority. This theory is called the Autonomous (Greek, *αὐτός*, self, and *νόμος*, law), as it finds the moral law in man's own nature. Some philosophers consider this inward voice as that of Reason and Intelligence, and are known as Rationalists. The ancient philosophers, and those of the century of the Great Revolution, were rationalists in this respect, and considered reason as the supreme judge and sovereign authority in moral conduct. Foremost among the exponents of the Autonomous theory is Kant. Reason, however, had to make room for feeling. The sovereign authority is to be found in ourselves, as Hume, Schopenhauer, Adam Smith, and others maintained; it is,

however, not centred in reason, but in feeling. The ultimate sanction of all morality is a feeling innate or implanted in our mind. "It is a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated natures rises, in the more serious cases, into a shrinking from it as an impossibility." Opposed to the Autonomously theory is the Heteronomously, which locates the sanction of moral conduct and the moral law in external authority. The fear of God, the supreme Ruler of the universe, or of our fellow creatures, the hope or finding favour before the eternal Judge or approval from our neighbours, are the bases of the moral duty. The moral law, or the rules and duties of moral conduct, are accepted from an authority other than ourselves, either the will of God, the sovereign, or the law of society.

Closely related to these ethical problems is that of self-control or free-will. Is the supremacy of moral law such as to influence our will and make it subservient? Does our obedience to moral law pre-suppose a deliberate resolution, leaving the moral agent free to contemplate the law, but to shape his action as he pleases, and to apply the law in accordance with circumstances? Or are we bound by nature to act in a given case in a certain way and not otherwise, our will being a chain in the law of causality? and our determination, seemingly taken freely by ourselves, only the necessary result of an existing cause pre-determining the events to follow? Two philosophical schools have discussed, and are still discussing, this momentous problem. The first upholds the absolute freedom of the will, as *not* determined by any cause, and is known as the Indeterminist School. The other adheres to the theory of causality, making the will of the moral agent and his determination dependent upon some preceding cause, and is known as the Determinist School. Indeterminism and Determinism form one of the most important problems, to solve which has been the interest not only of Philosophy, but also of Theology.

CHAPTER XIII

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTIONS ; OR, THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

§ 1. PHILOSOPHY has often been defined as the theory of "being and knowing." Metaphysics or Ontology inquires into the essence and origin of Being, and the questions dealing with Knowledge in itself—its essence, origin, and limitation—form a new branch of Philosophy, that of the Theory of Knowledge, or Epistemology. The first Greek philosophers turned their attention to the question of what things really are, and what is the intrinsic nature of things. This philosophizing and reflection, however, transcending the existing current and naive conceptions and ideas, gradually led the thinker, searching for truth behind and above things, to another question : Why are my views different from those of the mass of mankind? Why do my theories, based on reflection, differ from the views current in ordinary life? I *know* that the multitude is in error, and that my explanations are true. There is a world of things "without" me, and my mind knows them. Yet, how did this knowledge of things enter my mind, giving rise to the ideas which reproduce the world of things within it? How have I gained this knowledge, and why does the multitude think differently? Where is the source of the truth which I have gained, where is the origin of knowledge and its limitations, and what is its nature and essence? These epistemological inquiries further led to doubt as to the trustworthiness and validity of knowledge. Is it at all possible to know the truth, to find a universally valid criterion? Thus, while the first inclination of the human mind is to

act without questioning itself, man's doubt and mistrust are awakened as soon as he falls into error, especially when he discovers the contradictions of human opinions. Thought, after having been directed to external things, turns upon itself, questioning its own validity. It asks: What is knowledge, and what is its relation to reality? Is there a possibility of knowledge, and is the human mind capable of attaining it, and if so, *how* does it reach that knowledge? Such are the questions and inquiries to which the human mind, in its desire to know, turns from its metaphysical speculations.

"Philosophy," says Paulsen, "everywhere began with Metaphysics; questions as to the shape, form and origin of the universe, the nature and origin of Being, the essence of the soul and its relation to the body, form the first subject-matter of philosophical reflection. After long occupation, however, with such investigations, the question arises as to the nature of Knowledge and its possibility. The human mind has to face the philosophical problem, as to whether it is at all possible for the human mind to solve these questions. Epistemology, or the Theory of Knowledge, is thus evolved as a critical reflection upon Metaphysics."¹ Thus the problems arising from the questions as to the validity and limit of man's faculty of Knowledge and its relation to the reality of things to be known, form the subject-matter of Epistemology (from *ἐπιστήμη* (*epistēmē*), Knowledge, and *λόγος* (*logos*), discourse), or the Theory of Knowledge.

The scope and function of Epistemology and its problems can, however, be reduced to three principal questions:

1. What is Knowledge? or the question of the nature of Knowledge;
2. How do we obtain our Knowledge? or the question of the origin of Knowledge; and
3. Is there a possibility of Knowledge? or the question of the validity and limits of Knowledge.

§ 2. To these questions various answers have been given in the course of the history of thought, according to

¹ Cf. Paulsen, "Einleitung in die Philosophie," 9th ed., 1903, p. 365.

the systems and schools of Philosophy. Knowledge, some philosophers thought, is the exact copy and representation in our mind of reality. Things are exactly so in reality as they appear to us through the medium of our perceptive faculties. The world "without" is as real as, and exists independently of, our consciousness which perceives it. Appearance and reality are absolutely identical, and the perception of things as they *really* are is Knowledge. This doctrine, viz. That reality exists apart from its presentation to, or conception by, consciousness is called Realism. What we perceive with a degree of certitude or probability and recognize by reflection, thus constituting our Knowledge of the things, is the product of an objective, really existent factor, independently of our own consciousness. Knowledge is therefore, according to the doctrine of Realism, the perception of things as they *really* are, through the medium of our physical and psychical organism. A thing is black or red, because it possesses those qualities which make it appear black or red when reflected in the human eye. Those qualities are really existent, whether or not the thing is reflected in a human eye. In contradistinction to the doctrine of Realism, Epistemological Idealism (or Phenomenalism) maintains that "perceptions of things" and "things in themselves," that "thought" and "existence," or reality, are widely different. Knowledge, according to the Idealists, is not at all the perception of things as they really are—the exact copy and repetition of things in themselves—but as they appear to us. Knowledge being an inner, psychical process, there can be no similarity between it and the things "without." The world around us is only the product of our mind. All that we know of the world and the things without—be it through our sense-perception or by means of reflection—is only imagination, the product of our own mind. Whilst therefore the Realist considers that in sense-perception we have a certainty, and a guarantee of the reality of existence, the Idealist is of opinion that "the only reality of the external world is its perceptibility."

§ 3. To the second question, viz. the origin and sources of our knowledge, two answers have been given.

According to the theory termed Sensationalism, or Empiricism, all knowledge originates in sensations. The source of our knowledge is first perception (sensuous perception), inner or outer. By combining these perceptions and elaborating them, we gather experience; by gathering and developing the experiences gained, we obtain knowledge. Knowledge has therefore its origin in the activity of the senses, in "perceiving" and in "experiencing," as contrasted with "thinking" or "thought."¹ All cognition therefore, even reflective ideas and intuitions, can be traced to elementary sensations. Sensationalism, or Empiricism, is thus the doctrine which maintains that experience is the *sole*, or at least the principal, source of knowledge. All knowledge arises in experience. Experience, however, is of two kinds. It is derived either from the external senses or from the internal sense. The perception of external objects is termed Sensation, whilst that of internal phenomena is called Reflection. The perceptions external and internal are the only windows through which the light of knowledge penetrates "into the dark chamber of the Understanding."

"Let us then suppose," says Locke (in his "Essay concerning Human Understanding"), "the mind to be white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes

¹ Protagoras, the head of the Sophists, taught that perception is the only source of knowledge. Perception, however, is the adequate knowledge of what is perceived, but no knowledge of the thing. Every opinion therefore which grows out of perception is valid only for the one perceiving, and for him even only at the moment of his perceiving. There is no *universal* validity in it. And as there is no other human knowledge than perception, there is consequently nothing whatever valid in human knowledge. Plato admitted this view, namely, that perception can only be the knowledge of something that arises and passes away, and is transitory. Perception, according to Plato, gives only opinion (*δόξα*); it teaches what *appears*, not what *is* in reality. Whilst, however, for Protagoras, the Sensationalist, there is no knowledge of what is, Plato (in his works, "Theætetus" and "Timæus") transcends the former by teaching the validity of knowledge. The nearest approximate to knowledge is "the right opinion (*ὀρθή δόξα*) for which one can give a reason (*μετὰ λόγῳ*)."¹ But it is to thought that Plato looks for a knowledge of what really and truly is. He is thus a rationalist in his epistemological theories.

it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from experience; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understanding with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring. . . . These alone, so far as I can discover, are the windows by which light is let into this dark room; for methinks the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only some little opening left to let in external visible resemblances, or ideas of things without. . . . Thus," he continues, "the first capacity of the human intellect is, that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it, either through the senses by outer objects or by its own operations when it reflects on them. This is the first step a man makes towards the discovery of anything, and the groundwork whereon to build all those notions whichever he shall have naturally in this world. All those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and ~~float~~ ^{float} here: in all that goodly extent wherein the mind wanders—in those remote speculations it may seem to be elevated with—it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which sense or reflection has offered for its contemplation." (Bk. II., Chap. I.) Thus Empiricism, or Sensationalism, asserts that the experiential alone is knowable, and that the only organ of reality and valid knowledge is sensibility. Whatever is to be knowable must be given as a real insensuous intuition. According to the Empiricist, all our concepts arise from and are due to the faculty of perception, whilst the faculty of thought is an almost inactive recipient of messages coming to it from without. (Cf. Falckenberg; *l.c.*, p. 318.)

§ 4. Opposed to the theory of Sensationalism, or Em-

piricism, is that of Intellectualism, or Rationalism. The experience gained through the senses, the Rationalists say, is fallacious, and is the source of illusion. The senses cause deceit and error—give fraud and a lie. If, argue the Rationalists, all our knowledge arises from perception, then knowledge is impossible. For perception and experience inform us only concerning single cases, and can never comprehend all cases. There can therefore never be a universal truth. If knowledge is to be possible, then some concepts which constitute knowledge cannot originate in the senses. The sense is the enemy rather than the servant of true knowledge. What it reveals to the mind is the deceptive exterior of things, not the true non-sensuous essence. (Cf. Falckenberg, *l.c.*, p. 319.) Knowledge is therefore only gained by thought. Only by thinking can we “rise above the realm of changing appearance.” Whilst the Empiricists ascribe to the senses and to reflection the origin of knowledge, the Rationalists see in understanding and reason the sole source of knowledge. Science and Philosophy, they say, tend towards universality and necessity, as they are offered in mathematics, which are the chief characteristics of scientific knowledge. They can never be attained through experience, which is limited, but by way of reason, which forms conceptions and is the only active factor. Again, how could the unperceivable and supra-sensible, the Deity, immortality, the totality of the world, be understood if we had to consider experience and not reason as the source of our ideas and our knowledge? Through abstract thinking alone, turned into ourselves, the real essence and nature of reality could be grasped and understood. “Nothing,” some maintain, in opposition to the theory of Empiricism, “comes into the soul from without; it cannot bring forth anything which it has not within it from the beginning.”

§ 5. Rationalism and Empiricism, however, only busy themselves with the problem of knowledge. Knowledge, says the former doctrine, is obtained through pure reason, or, to use a technical term, *a priori*, and by the road of pure reason alone we attain the absolute knowledge of things, a process quite impossible to produce through sense-

perception. Empiricism denies this statement, viz. that there is an *a priori* knowledge. Neither of the two systems, however, attempts to solve the question as to the *possibility* of knowledge. Both approach things in the full confidence that the human mind is capable of cognizing them. Both show a naïve trust in human intelligence. The trust, however, in reason and its power to possess itself of truth, having been shaken by the doctrine of the Empiricist, the consequence was that reason itself was first distrusted, and then subjected to a critical examination.

The question arose : Is there a possibility of knowledge? And if so, how far does it extend and what are its limits? Rationalism and Empiricism instituted no inquiry into this question, but had held as an article of faith that we do possess the power of cognizing objects either by perception or by thought, and that things are in reality as they are perceived. These two systems are therefore termed Dogmatism, with regard to the attitude they take up towards the last question.

In opposition to Dogmatism two other answers, constituting two new systems of Philosophy, have been given to the above question concerning the *possibility* and the *extent* of human knowledge. One is Scepticism and the other is Criticism. Scepticism simply doubts, and denies the possibility of knowledge and man's capacity for it. It refrains from giving any positive assertion. In contradistinction to Scepticism, Criticism, instead of simply denying and unreasonably distrusting it, investigates not only how knowledge arises but also *how far it extends*.

Criticism finds itself confronted by two problems, the second of which cannot be solved until after the solution of the first. Before investigating the sources of knowledge, the *extents of knowledge* must be inquired into, and the possibility proved. Only after the conditions of knowledge have been established can one ascertain what objects are attainable by it. (Falckenberg, *l.c.*, p. 322.)

§ 6. Without going into details, a few words may be added as to the historical line of development of the epistemological questions. In ancient Philosophy the Sophists were practically the first to raise the epistemo-

logical problems, and thus gave rise to Rationalism and Empiricism. The questions were discussed by the Eleatics, by Plato and Aristotle, by the Stoics, the Sceptics, and the Epicureans. In modern times the epistemological questions come into the foreground in Britain as well as on the Continent in the seventeenth century. Rationalism has maintained its sway on the Continent in the systems of Descartes († 1650), Spinoza († 1677), Leibniz († 1716), and Wolff († 1754), while the British thinkers, Bacon († 1626), Hobbes († 1679), and especially John Locke (1632–1704), are Empiricists. The Empiricism of Locke in its turn led to the Scepticism of Hume († 1776) in England, whose inquiries gave Kant the strongest impulse to the development of his Criticism and “woke him from his dogmatic slumber.”

CONCLUSION

Such, in broad outline, are the scope and subject-matter of Philosophy in all its branches. It is a difficult task to encompass a subject, upon which volumes have been written, within the narrow bounds of a popular treatise. This difficulty is enhanced when the subject in question is one on which opinions of the schools differ so widely as in Philosophy, and where the controversies extend to the very definition of the nature and essence of the subject. Two things, however, I hope I have made clear to the reader :

(1) That Philosophy endeavours to find answers to the eternal questions of How? What? and Why? What exists? How did it come into existence? What do we know? What are we to do? Why must we act thus and not otherwise?

(2) That Philosophy is not something apart from real life, but concerns itself with everyday-existence. Its school is the world, its subject-matter the phenomena of the universe, its text-book human reason. Philosophy is *thought* applied to the nature of the real world around us and to all its manifestations—to the life in the vast universe of which we are each a part and to the life within us. It embraces the macrocosm and the microcosm. All this is open to the observation of the humble as well as of the

mighty, of the learned and of the ignorant, and hence every man is in some respect, at certain moments of his life, a philosopher. As long as human thought exists, Philosophy will exist. The problems of the philosophers of all ages have not always been the same. They could not have been. The history of human thought bears the same impress of progress and evolution which is noticeable everywhere. Old problems disappear and new ones take their place. Just as the grown-up man looks back with a smile upon the ideas of his early youth, realizing that what was once most interesting to him is now trivial, so the human race, in its march onward, changes its notions, conceptions, and ideals, rejects old beliefs and replaces them with new ones. Scarcely does the human mind find an answer to an old perplexing question when a new one arises ; almost simultaneously with the discovery that what appeared a mysterious phenomenon is a very simple occurrence, the natural event of a given cause, there emerges a new point on the horizon of human thought. The craving and yearning for knowledge, the desire to raise the veil of nature, to penetrate her secrets, and know the truth, will be everlasting in the human breast. Mighty revolutions in the domain of thought will solve old riddles, upset deep-rooted conceptions, and shatter old creeds and ideals ; but humanity must have new ones. To solve the ever-rising, hydra-headed riddles ; to work for the realisation of new ideals ; to set up a new truth in the place of the old—one to which humanity can cling and by which it may shape its action and conduct—has for ever been, and will continue to be, the aim of Philosophy.

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The purpose of this book is to supply the beginner in Philosophy with a kind of student's guide to the problems of the science and the solutions which have been proposed. History is subordinated to exposition, but it has proved natural to observe a chronological order within the divisions of the subject-matter, inasmuch as the succession of schools corresponds to the stages in the evolution of thought.

Necessarily, much has been mentioned in a sketch of less than 128 pages which might have been developed in separate treatises; but the writer hopes that nothing has been omitted which is essential to the design of providing an Introduction to Philosophy in as brief a compass and in as accurate a form as are compatible with clearness, thoroughness, and that faithfulness to truth which is the last and best lesson of the philosophers.

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